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Comprehensive constitutional and philosophical values are to be addressed 
consistently by government and it should be largely applicable in the bureaucracy 
(Garofalo & Geuras, 1999). Protecting the human rights of the people is a duty required 
of all countries around the world under international law. In order to protect these rights, 
these countries must have a fair and effective criminal justice system. In particular, the 
police are the people most directly responsible for protecting human rights. The way the 
police handle their job is the crucial determinant of status of these states, whether they 
meet or fail to meet their most important obligation of respecting the human rights of the 
people in their jurisdictions. They interact with the public on a daily basis. As officers of 
the state, they alone have the responsibility of enforcing the law. A culture of human 
rights should be introduced and reinforced in every police agency for a better policing 
practice (Crawshaw, Devlin, & Williamson, 1998). 
When a nation such as the United States (US) becomes suspicious of executive 
power and continually limits the power of the government, it might be thought that the 
power of the police would be limited as well (Blecker, 1989; Shaw, 1968). However, like 
every other country, the US allows its police a great deal of power. In fact, they are the 
only agency authorized by the state to use force (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001). 
Unfortunately this power, like any other, can be corrupted and abused for political gain. 
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The conduct of police officers should not only be within the limits of the law, but even 
exemplary (Champion, 2001). How do police, then, become corrupted? 
When governmental power is limited, it is usually due to a fear among the people 
that that power might be abused (Blecker, 1989). In an attempt to control the behavior of 
officers, almost all police agencies throughout the world have become highly regulated, 
bureaucratic, and paramilitary organizations (Weisburd, McElroy, & Hardyman, 1989; 
Schellenberg, 2000). 
Although, misconduct of the police is mostly attributed to police organizations, 
police deviance is not simply a result of organizational characteristics. It is also a result of 
the police subculture, an occupation-specific behavioral system characterized by 
conservatism, cynicism, isolation from society, solidarity, code of silence, racial 
prejudice, and more (Kampanakis, 2002). When these characteristics become more 
pervasive, they become more dangerous. The police are entitled to use coercive power to 
enforce the law. However, a feature of that coercive power is its potential to be misused 
(Bittner, 1975; Eschholz & Vaughn, 2001). This power to use force in an unlawful way is 
an enormous disaster for a democratic society where public trust to police is 
unconditional and the doctrine of police is community service oriented. 
Police misconduct is as pervasive in the US as it is in England, Canada, 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France, Russia, and South Africa (Champion, 2001). 
Despite efforts to combat it, police misconduct is incessant and there is no systematic 
approach to solve the problem. Allegations of police misconduct, brutality, and 
harassment have popped up all over the US. The problem is not only nationwide, but it 
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has become an inherent part of the police institution (Champion, 2001; US Commission 
on Civil Rights, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 1998). Moreover, poor recruitment 
practices, poor training, and poor management continue to prevent abusive officers from 
being sued or disciplined. The misconduct of a number of officers is spoiling entire 
police departments and ruining an otherwise healthy relationship between the police and 
the public. Recent reports of police misconduct in the US have brought about greater 
police accountability and civilian involvement with police administrative and disciplining 
decisions. These newly involved citizens are calling for more intervention, more 
investigation of police misconduct and tighter disciplinary measures. They want reform 
in police agencies (Russell, 1997; Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
The history of American policing is a unique cycle of problem and reform. Once 
society discovers a problem with the way the police operate, the reform soon follows. 
Americans, according to Skolnick and Fyfe, have a revolutionary spirit that aims to limit 
the government. American people are opposed to the establishment of a formal police 
organization as a result of their distrust of formal authority (as cited in Cohen, 1996). 
However, a free society exists only when laws are enforced and social order is 
maintained. These aims can only be achieved when a democratic police institution exists 
(Mutlu, 2000). To even imagine a society without police is ridiculous. Therefore, police 
conduct must be kept within the limits of the law and the interests of society. 
Moreover, police misconduct is no longer simply a local problem. Today, 
countries have an international image to uphold. The 1991 Rodney King beating by Los 
Angeles police officers is a good example of how a single police action may negatively 
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affect the image of a country in the eyes of the world. The United Nations has developed 
standards of behavior to guide all countries and deter this type of misconduct. In its 
publications the UN advises officers to comply with international human rights standards 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1996). 
The above-mentioned arguments make it clear that “police conduct,” or for the 
purposes of this report, “police misconduct” should be monitored and controlled by an 
outside party.  There should be an ongoing process and continuous effort to prevent 
police officers of their conduct unbecoming. In order to prevent police from unreasonable 
conduct, certain standards must be set and legal sanctions must be imposed. Provisions of 
this sort are found in legal texts that bind every police officer to act in due regard. 
However, the most important aspect of preventing police misconduct is not having legal 
provisions. It is more important how effectively the sanctions brought by these provisions 
are applied to police misconduct cases. 
The history of American policing is worth studying for no other reason than to 
learn from past mistakes. Actually, every constitutional democracy has some kind of 
regulations to prevent police misconduct. The biggest difference between the countries is 
in how they have applied their rules and procedures and the ways, in which those 
regulations have been shaped over time, the degree to which those regulations are 
effective against police misconduct varies greatly among the countries. It is then very 
important to determine which remedy is more effective and appropriate to prevent police 
conduct unbecoming. 
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It should be accepted that in each and every country, there are problems of police 
misconduct, and there is no country where their police force has never been accused of 
depriving the rights of citizens or immune from doing so (Champion, 2001). The 
difference among different countries is in their responses to these problems, in how 
effective their remedies are. 
This study does not seek to determine the reasons that police act improperly. 
Rather, I am interested in understanding how to avoid these unconstitutional acts. 
Luckily, the American democratic system has its own checks and balances to handle 
constitutional violations. According to one author, the police brutality problem is 
exaggerated in the US (Puddington, 2001). Moreover, in comparison to other 
democracies, American democracy is very adaptable to change when the public feels the 
change is necessary. The system adjusts itself to new situations. However, the problem of 
American society is its resistance to change when the change comes from covert 
institutions that are out of popular control. The American policing experience, therefore, 
is very unique to study in that there are examples of both totalitarian (conservatives) and 
liberal societies. In other words, the American criminal justice system preserves both 
autocratic and democratic policies (Zalman, 2000). In spite of some arguments to the 
contrary (Luna, 2000), American policing has very unique characteristics that are not 
common to most otherworld police organizations. These three characteristics are 
“responsiveness to citizen demands,” “public accountability,” and “openness to 
evaluation” (Bayley, 1998). 
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 Since the misconduct of police is directly and easily related to the overall 
performance of a government in protecting the basic rights and civil liberties of its 
citizens, this study aims to provide a clear understanding of the standards used to prevent 
police misconduct in a modern democracy, the United States. The methods that have 
been used to prevent police misconduct are the responses of a modern society to rule-
breakers. These methods have different strengths and weaknesses in preventing police 
from abusing their power. There are three types of controls on the police: control 
thorough the police administration, control thorough the state, and control thorough the 
institutions of civil society. None of these controls are enough by themselves. Rather they 
are used together and in conjunction with other solutions (Stone & Ward, 2000). Police 
abuse of power is, by its very nature, in conflict with the values of a democratic society. 
This conflict warrants a special scrutiny on the police use of power (Cao & Huang, 
2000). A broader body of research is needed to understand how training, policies, 
procedures, supervision, and discipline can minimize police misconduct and promote 
proper police behavior. 
This study is intended to offer that body of research by providing an overview of 
the methods that have been used in the US to regulate police discretion and limit abuses 
of power. These methods are promulgated by legislation, by regulation, or by court 
decision (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2001). After studying the methods used to limit 
police misconduct, they will be evaluated in an attempt to show how they may be applied 




This thesis aims to unearth the best deterrents of police misconduct. To this end, 
police misconduct will be defined. Secondly, the nature of police misconduct will be 
briefly evaluated. In particular, the author will attempt to discover whether police 
misconduct is pervasive throughout police organizations, or a very marginal occurrence 
that can be attributed to a few officers within these organizations and underlying causes 
of police misconduct. As a third step, the remedies that have been taken to deter police 
misconduct will be considered, noting especially whether they were imposed from inside 
the organization or outside the organization. The fourth step of this research will be to 
determine the success of these remedies in deterring police misconduct. Finally, the study 
will end with a discussion of the suitability and applicability of these remedies to the 
Turkish National Police Organization. The author will attempt to propose a model to 
improve control mechanisms of police misconduct of the Turkish National Police. 
The underlying assumption of this study is existence of a connection between the 
number police misconduct cases and suitability of control mechanisms to deter police 
misconduct. Because of the nature of the hypothesis, case study method has been applied 
to reveal the police misconduct-unsuitable control mechanisms connection in this thesis. 
In fact, without picturing this connection, one cannot build this study. American 
experience on control mechanisms of police misconduct will be reviewed as a case study. 
Currently there are three mechanisms that have been put in place to control police 
misconduct, whether this misconduct consists of the excessive use of force or the abuse 
of the authority of police: 
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Criminal Law: Police use of force should not exceed the limits of law in a way 
that constitutes a crime against the state. 
Civil Liability: Police use of force should not illegally harm a person. When 
police misconduct harms a person, that person, or his or her heirs, may seek monetary 
compensation. 
Fear of Scandal: An officer’s conduct should not embarrass the police agency 
(Klockars, 1996). 
As useful as Klockars’ controls may be, there are actually much more 
complicated forces at work to control the behavior of police. Police departments are 
highly paramilitaristic organizations where solidarity and group cohesion is extremely 
important. As a requirement of this organization, internal discipline is extremely 
formalized and outside interference is barred to a degree to make the police environment 
suit the job. As mentioned earlier, police misconduct is more an organizational deviance 
than an individual one (Reiner, 1998). From this point of view, classifying the forces that 
control police misconduct as either internal or external controls enables the observer to 
better understand the phenomenon. It should be accepted that controls that target the 
whole police organization are more effective than controls that target individual police 
officers. Once the target becomes the police organization, all levels of the police 
organization, from top to bottom, respond to the problem. This full-scale approach is 
more effective and more widely accepted. However, as Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert 
mention, it is equally important to understand both the structural and organizational 
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explanations of police misconduct and how the character of individual police officer is 
shaped in process of being a police officer (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998) 
Some scholars like Janet B.L. Chan classify police controls under 
“accountability” heading. This classification includes responsibility to the government, 
which has political and democratic control subheadings, restraint of police misconduct 
through fiscal measures, efficiency, performance and the cutting back of the public sector 
(Chan, 1999, p. 255), In addition to above mentioned civil and criminal litigation, 
disciplinary actions, and civilian oversight are different control mechanisms of police 
behavior. Combining all control mechanisms of police behavior avail the observer to see 
the complete picture of the phenomenon. However, the purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the control mechanisms that are identical in almost every community. In most 
societies, fiscal restraint is a sanction that has never been applied when police misconduct 
occurs. 
“Police Accountability Mechanisms” classification of Stone and Wards will be 
the main source of the author’s classification. Stone and Wards list three controls that 
deter police misconduct: internal or departmental control; state or governmental control; 
and social control, or control by civil society (See Table1) (Stone & Wards, 2000). 
However Stone and Wards’ state control and social control will be categorized as 
external measures. As a result, control mechanisms of police misconduct will be studied 




Table 1. Police Accountability Mechanisms 
Source: Democratic Policing (Stone & Wards, 2000, p.17). 
 This paper will study these control mechanisms of police misconduct in the 
following order: 
a. Internal Measures 
i. Standards and Training 
ii. Internal Review Boards 
b. External Measures 
i. 42 USC § 1983 Civil Liability Cases and Other Lawsuits 
ii. Criminal Prosecution 
iii. Exclusionary Rule 
iv. Civilian Review Boards 
  Accountability for  
    Public safety  
(reducing crime, violence,    
disorder, and fear) 
Police behavior  
(reducing corruption,    brutality, and 
other misconduct) 
Internal control training, line commanders, 
crime statistics reporting, 
reward structure 
training, line supervisors, rules, ethics 
codes, integrity units, administrative 
discipline, peer pressure 
State control operational direction by 
elected pointed political 
officials, budget authorities, 
prosecutors 
ombudservices, legislative 
committees, criminal liability, civil 











Social control neighborhood safety 
councils, community-based 
organizations, media, 
policing research and policy 
institutes 
civilian complaint review, external 
auditors, media, human rights 
monitors,  policing research and 
policy institutes 
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A general overview of each of these control mechanisms will help the author to 
create a model control strategy for Turkish National Police. To this end, pros and cons of 
each mechanism will be studied. Due to the nature of the subject, legal sanctions, 
departmental policies, the education techniques of police departments, and the 
administration of civilian review boards will also be assessed with a close look whether 
they deter police misconduct or not. Overall, this study will primarily consist of library-
based research for the purpose of compiling a comprehensive literature review on the 
subject. Literature will be gathered from different sources; mainly journal articles, 
scholarly books, the Supreme Court and appeal courts decisions (case law), law reviews, 
and Commission reports on police misconduct. 
Several keywords will be used to research these sources including police 
misconduct, criminal prosecution, civil liability, internal review boards, civilian review 
boards, exclusionary rule, police training, and standards in policing. 
The articles for this literature review will be gathered from different sources. For 
example, while some articles will be selected from Internet, some of others will be 
gathered from academic journals in the area of Criminal Justice, such as Justice 
Quarterly, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Journal of Crime and Justice, 
Journal of Criminal Justice; and law reviews such as Iowa Law Review, Buffalo Criminal 
Law Review and DePaul Law Review. All of the resources selected for this study will be 
of the highest professional and scholarly quality. Some journal articles and commission 
reports will be obtained from reliable Internet resources. In addition to academic journals 
and the Internet, some chapters and sections from different books will be examined in 
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order to gather a greater breadth and depth of information about police misconduct 
problems and their solutions. Naturally, most of the books will be selected from the areas 
of constitutional law and policing. Some important cases and their outcomes will be 
mentioned, such as the Rodney King case in Los Angeles. In the aftermath of Rodney 
King beating, the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (the 
Christopher Commission) is created by Tom Bradley, the mayor of at the time. This 
Commission proposed suggestions for reforms (US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000). 
The results of the Christopher Commission report and other similar reports will be used 
to formulate a hypothetical control model of police misconduct incidents in Turkey. 
The degree of which the rights and civil liberties of US citizens are violated in 
their encounters with police and suitability of these control mechanisms to deter police 
misconduct will be studied. After presenting this picture, the “gray areas” will be 
discussed along with controls to repair any flaws that are discovered. These controls will 
be looked over for their suitability to deter police misconduct. Comparison of the 
historical evolution of these remedies along with their weaknesses and strengths will be 
done. Prior research in journal articles, special commission reports, and Supreme Court 
decisions will be studied and the ideas that are found within these sources will be 
supported or refuted by information gathered from scholarly books. 
The research mentioned in the articles was collected using various methods of 
data collection: field research, experimental research, existing records analysis, and 
secondary data analysis. This study will take into consideration the mutual findings of all 
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these sources and will try to conclude what methods can be useful to make policing both 
effective and constitutional. 
The subheadings of this report will carry some examples from several areas of 
concern such as the application of 42 USC Section 14141 (Section 14141 ) to the police 
departments of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville, Ohio, both resulting in consent 
decrees, a willful agreement between parties under the supervision of a judge, in 1997. 
These examples will help to determine which source of reform is more effective and 
useful. The reforms presented here are new approaches to police-citizen encounters and 
based on new philosophies that aim to help police better serve the community and help 
the community to accept the police as their guardians. 
Cases that receive a large amount of media attention tend to affect the whole 
country. Their examples will be more highlighted than others. This study is intended to 
determine the best system for making police accountable to their public. The worst 
incidents and best successes will be emphasized to see both extremes, making symptoms 
more visible and treatments more understandable. 
 Supreme Court decisions serve as cornerstones for real and longstanding 
solutions to police problems. Cases such as Miranda v. Arizona (1966) fundamentally 
change the way police operate. These Supreme Court decisions are examples of court-
made rules. In the same way, the legislature with its laws such as 42 USC Section 14141, 
shapes the way executive branch operates. Both court-made rules and legislation on 
policing problems will be determined as reform impositions from outside the police 
 14
organization. Their effectiveness will be a concern in comparing them with the reform 
initiatives that come from inside the organization. 
In conclusion, police misconduct will be analyzed from a multidimensional 
perspective wherein the rights and liberties of citizens will be of primary concern. 
However, this concern will never overshadow the police functions in situations where use 
of power is appropriate and necessary. Having police protection will be considered an 
inalienable right of citizens. That having been said, this research will make the 
assumption that the primary duty of the police is to serve the community, rather than act 
as guardians of the state. 
The position of the researcher will be as an impartial observer. The researcher will 
speak with the words of other experts and researchers. This research aims to combine 
symptoms and treatments into one large “melting pot,” the end result being a type of 
policing that is beneficial for both citizens and police from a human rights and civil 
liberties standpoint. 
The policies that police organizations have adapted and the effects of these 
policies on organizational structure will be examined. The structure of the organization 
determines the way that the police provide service to their citizens. The ways in which 
police organizations change their organizational structure, procedure, and processes are 
critical. However, the focus will not be on an overall organizational change, but on the 
new philosophies that are intended to better serve the citizens. The primary question here 
is whether police organizations change their structures and organizational processes 






DEFINITIONS and CONCEPTS 
The Source of Police Power 
The US Constitution is the single most important document affecting the police 
today. However, the Constitution provides only very general direction to police 
departments. The Bill of Rights outlines the rights of the citizens that must be protected. 
After all, it must be remembered that the first police organization in the US did not come 
into existence until more than a century after the Constitution was written (Swanson et 
al., 2001). 
However, despite the fact that the policing institution has never been mentioned in 
the Constitution, still it can be inferred from its general provisions and from the Bill of 
Rights provisions that the basic rights of the people are very important. The government 
is obliged to secure these rights. The sole reason for adding the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution is to make sure that people are secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects. The framers of the Constitution recognized the insufficient protection of 
individual citizens and reorganized the checks and balances on behalf of individuals 
against potential abuses of new federal government by adopting the Amendments, the 
Bill of Rights, in 1791 to the Constitution. Three of these amendments, the 4th, 5th, and 
6th, are directly related to police activities. The 1st Amendment to the Constitution is very 
clear that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, or petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.” So, according to the Constitution, human element of the state comes first. 
When we understand the purpose of establishing police as to protect and to serve the 
public, then, the primary objective of policing becomes to respect rights of people and to 
serve them. Actually, there are two approaches to define constitutions. One is to define 
them as an institutional organization of political system. The latter defines constitution as 
a mechanism for the restraint of the power holders in the political system (Wolf-Phillips, 
1972; Vila & Morris, 1999). 
Policing institution is an arm of executive branch in a government. As a relatively 
modern one, the US Constitution is a document that restricts government from infringing 
upon the freedoms of citizens. The governmental power is limited in the point where the 
freedoms begin. Citizens should be free from government intrusion in their acts. It is very 
clear that the spirit of the Constitution looks to the guard fundamental rights and 
privileges of citizens against the government (Janda, Berry, & Goldman, 1995). 
 Maintaining order is the duty of the police force in the cities and countries of the 
modern world. However, this duty becomes clouded in times when unnecessarily violent 
acts are permitted against outsiders or minorities. In modern countries, regulations on the 
use of physical force often contain contradictory and ambiguous principles, leaving a 
huge gray area open to the interpretation of executives (Meyer, Brunk, & Wilson, 2001). 
Since the theoretical background of the American Constitution supports the protection of 
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all people, those who violate the constitutional rights and privileges of people should be 
punished more severely than perpetrators of ordinary crimes. 
 Author Egon Bittner states, “The role of the police is best understood as a 
mechanism for the distribution of nonnegotiable coercive force employed in accordance 
with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies” (as cited in Kerstetter et 
al., 1996). According to Bittner, the nature of the police job is nothing but a series of 
conflict resolved through the use of force. None of the parties in this conflict resolution 
system are happy, but to some extent, all are forced to sacrifice some rights unwillingly. 
Police work is not only conflict management, however. The police sometimes apply 
sanctions, sometimes use force, and sometimes proactively move to prevent crime. 
 David Cohen sees the police as a unique arm of the government. The police are 
entitled to use physical force both for and against people in order to protect the public at 
large. In fact, the only institution that has the power to use physical force to control 
problems in society is the police force (Cohen, 1996).  The police then have not only a 
very complicated position in society. They have a very problematic position. Franklin 
states that the “police power of state” is established to secure the common good, the 
general prosperity, as well as the public safety, health, and moral values. Franklin asserts 
that this power is nonnegotiable, but should not be used arbitrarily or oppressively. Police 
should primarily use force only when it serves the greater good (Franklin, 1999). 
On the other hand, Michael Conant points out that, constitutional limitations 
function “to protect the civil rights of persons against abusive actions in any branch of the 
government.” If civil rights are at stake, then constitutional limitations should be 
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considered from a civil rights perspective, because “these civil rights are all privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.” Any statutes that run contrary to this idea 
will be against the ideological origins of the American government and unconstitutional 
(Conant, 2001). The civil rights of individuals are superior to whims of governmental 
legislative bodies. At this heart the American colonists created the American Constitution 
because their individual rights were being over run by an oppressive monarchy. Indeed, 
before the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men are 
created equal and are inherently entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
(Jefferson, 1776). 
According to Goldstein, the police have the awesome ability to disrupt individual 
freedom. They can invade the privacy of individual very suddenly and directly. To make 
a free society possible, despite their anomalous position, a democracy must depend upon 
police to maintain order. The ability of police to use power is the direct result of 
democratic values and the need to preserve the individuals’ quality of life (Goldstein, 
1977). 
Alpert and Macdonald (2001) support the idea that the police are distinguished 
from other professions and from citizens due to their power or authority to use force. The 
authors mention several research findings related to police use of force. In particular, they 
cite a study done by the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 
(1991), which found most officers are not involved in illegitimate use of force incidents. 
The number of police officers who are more likely to use force or who do use force is 
very small. Moreover, the study found that, surprisingly, individual characteristics do not 
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predict whether an officer will be more likely to use force. Rather, the characteristics of 
the police organization are the main determinants of the rates at which officers use force 
(Alpert & McDonald, 2001). 
The police have a very complex role within the society. They are entrusted with a 
great deal of power to be used both for and against the people they are sworn to serve and 
protect.  The only institution within society that may use force legally to control 
problematic situations is the police force (Cohen, 1996). 
Roberg and Kuykendall explain the principals of democratic policing by 
comparing policing in democracies to policing in totalitarian governments. Police in 
totalitarian governments serve the interests of a few rulers. These rulers place the highest 
value on social order at the expense of individual freedom (Roberg & Kuykendall, 1993). 
Social order itself, however, is not a bad thing, even in democracies. The key point is to 
determine how an administration maintains order. In democratic governments, checks 
and balances are well established and the citizens, at least theoretically, participate in 
decision-making.  Nevertheless, the executive and legislative branches of an organized 
society are presumed, even in democracies, to be a potential threat to human rights 
(Cross, 1999). 
The Problem of Police Misconduct 
Society is the main source of authority for police. The people give the authority to 
uphold and enforce the law. The misuse of this authority results in police misconduct. For 
a better understanding of police misconduct, one must first understand what police power 
is, then how it becomes police misconduct. 
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The American Heritage Dictionary defines police power as, “The inherent 
authority of a government to impose restrictions on private rights for the sake of public 
welfare, order, and security” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000). The distinctive 
characteristic of police power is its ability to restrict the people. When an officer is 
enforcing the law, he or she is usually in some way placing restrictions on one or more of 
the citizens. 
Misconduct is defined as, “Behavior not conforming to prevailing standards or 
laws; impropriety. Deliberate wrongdoing, especially by government or military 
officials” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000). Police misconduct, then, consists of 
using power of the police in manner that is inconsistent with the law. 
Police misconduct is either an unlawful excursion from official duties and 
responsibilities, or an abuse of official authority that may consist of a broad range of 
behaviors, including police corruption, police deviance, and excessive force. In other 
words, police misconduct is an occupational deviance in a form of departure from 
standards that are an integral part of the police mission. This departure may be an 
unlawful departure, an immoral departure, or both, and violates one or many criminal 
laws, departmental rules and regulations, and police ethical standards. Misconduct occurs 
when officers abuse their discretionary power either by disregarding a lawful obligation 
or by using their occupational power for personal ends with the pretense of acting under 
the color of law (Champion, 2001, pp. 1-2; Armstrong and Cinnamon, 1976; Abadinski 
& Winfree, 1992; Barker & Wells, 1982; Luna, 2000).  According to Champion (2001), 
“police misconduct originates and persists as an abuse of police discretion” (p. 1). “Police 
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officer misconduct is committing a crime and/or not following police department policy 
guidelines and regulations in the course of one’s officer duties” (p. 3). 
For their own use, the FBI defines police misconduct as a less obvious 
wrongdoing such as striking suspects more than necessary or threatening to harm them if 
they do not cooperate. The use of excessive force, sexual assault, intentional false arrest, 
the falsification of evidence, and extortion are the most common types of police 
misconduct (FBI, 2000). 
Police use of force is more distinctive when it is compared with the acts of normal 
citizens. Police use of force is within the limits of the law when it does not constitute a 
crime, while the same act when committed by citizens would constitute a crime 
(Klockars, 1996).  The term “use of force” is used to refer to the lawful use of force by 
police. When police exceed these lawful limits, the term to be used should be “police 
misconduct”, “police brutality”, or “police excessive use of force” (Bittner, 1975). 
The Characteristics of Police Misconduct 
According to The Dictionary of Criminal Justice, misconduct while holding 
public office is “Negligent, improper, dishonorable, or unlawful behavior on the part of 
an individual holding a position of public trust, which may result in removal from office” 
(Rush, 2000). However, police misconduct is not only an individual act, but in most 
instances an organization-wide form of deviance that results in an individual officer’s 
excessive use of force and authority. Police misconduct includes the abuse of discretion, 
corruption, and the unnecessary use of force (Lundman, 1980). 
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It is important to consider the specific characteristics of each individual case of 
police misconduct when attempting to remedy the situation. There are two types of 
misconduct: Organization-wide and Individualistic. The first type of misconduct is 
prevalent in all levels of the organization, and deviant patterns of behavior are known to 
almost everybody in the organization. Organization-wide misconduct is patterned and 
very frequent (Lundman, 1980). 
The second type of misconduct is limited to a few officers in the organization and 
is not known to exist throughout all levels of the organization. These are scattered deviant 
occupational behaviors that are hidden from fellow officers. As a result, these behaviors 
are rare and unpatterned throughout the organization (Lundman, 1980). 
Police administration is an extremely important determinant of the nature of 
misconduct in a police organization.  The chief of police is very important whether 
misconduct in an organization remains marginal or becomes prevalent in all levels. 
Whether police misconduct occurs among a few officers or organization-wide, it is 
important to remember that the characteristics of the organization predict whether 
officers engage in misconduct. However, recent developments diminish the sharpness of 
the distinction between the “few rotten apples” approach and the organization-wide 
approach. Like apples in a barrel, a few rotten cops can contaminate a police 
organization. Their misconduct becomes contagious and sets a bad example. Perry calls 
these types of contaminated organizations “rotten barrels”, where almost all officers are 
rotten, but administrators are still arguing that there are only a few. Perry quotes former 
New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Patrick Murphy after his speech 
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made on the findings of the Knapp Commission. Murphy states that corrupt police are not 
born, but made. They need to be examined organizationally. Dealing with only a few 
rotten apples is not enough to cure the problem (Perry, 2001). 
Underlying Reasons for Police Misconduct 
Philips and Smith discuss the degree to which police relations with the 
community are influenced by police use of force. To what degree is the community’s 
opinion influenced by the levels of force (either real or perceived) that the police use? As 
police use of force found to be reasonable or excessive? Levels of police use of force are 
vital determinants of the quality of police/community relations (Philips & Smith, 2000). 
Milton Mollen, chairman of the Special Commission to Investigate Corruption 
within the Police Department of the City of New York between 1990 and1992, asserts 
awesome authority of police use of power. According to Mollen, police have more power 
than judges. Being a member of the police force gives an officer social status, a gun, and 
power to arrest. Abusing this power is the result of “human nature.” However, assuming 
that police tying police abuse of authority is a part of human nature does not mean that 
every officer is corrupt, or that his behavior exceeds the limits of proper conduct. In large 
police organizations such as the NYPD, it is not unusual to find corrupt officers. In fact, 
it is expected. Corruption will naturally be present in almost every large-scale 
organization or occupational stratus. Moreover, most police misconduct cases consist of 
“a reflex action” that does not constitute an intentional wrongdoing.  Most of these 
improper behaviors are the result of enormous job tension. In spite of all these 
understandable reasons, the police subculture and its reflection as an “us vs. them” 
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rhetoric is responsible for most cases of misconduct. In addition, the lack of supervision 
and accountability mechanisms a great deal to the problem of police misconduct. Another 
factor that contributes to police misconduct is cosmopolitan character of highly populated 
cities that provide police officers the opportunity to deviate from proper conduct (Mollen, 
1998). 
Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) see reflex action as a conventional form of police 
response. Police violence in communities with high levels of social and economic 
inequality may occur for several reasons. First, police may use violence reflexively as a 
response to violence from offenders. Police may also use violence to assert power and 
authority over groups that they consider to be economically or racially inferior, which is 
called political threat explanation. Finally, police may have a greater fear for their own 
safety in these turbulent areas, leading them to more quickly turn to use of force (Jacobs 
& O’Brien, 1998). 
Kappeler and his co-authors view the individual police officer as a product of 
society. Police officers are selected according to dominant social norms and values, and 
they are expected to fit those standards. Their character is shaped during selection, 
through their contact with other officers and the public. In the US and around the world, 
the police represent the moral standards of the working middle class (Kappeler et al., 
1998). 
Roberg and Kuykendall (1993) point that the US history is full of tyrannical 
examples where the majority violated minority rights by discriminating against racial and 
ethnic minorities. Racial and ethnic discrimination idea of politics makes police to act 
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outside the limits of their duty. Meyer and his associates found antiauthority violence 
very common in the United States. The US is one of the most violent nations in the 
world. Violence is more common among Americans. To demonstrate this point, the death 
penalty in the US is still in use and is highly supported by the public at large despite the 
fact that most other industrialized nations have abolished death penalty (Meyer et al., 
2001). 
To learn more about the degree to which police recruits support the death penalty, 
a survey was conducted among Boston area police recruits. Their attitudes towards the 
death penalty were more supportive than any other section of the society.  The results of 
this study indicate how much police view violence to be a legitimate tool to be used 
against criminals. Without any field experience, the police recruit favors the death 
penalty more than an average citizen. If recruits are in favor of the death penalty, we can 
conclude that they are more likely to favor the physical use of force (Mignon & Holmes, 
1999). 
The biggest factor that influences the degree to which police behave in a 
constitutional manner is the use of political patronage, or the practicing of hiring and 
firing individuals based on their political affiliation. The history of political patronage in 
American policing goes back to the 1700’s, when night watch positions were filled with 
in-party loyal individuals by firing out-party loyal individuals. This custom resulted in 
the appointment of low caliber people to the police force. These people had minimal 
professional skill; they earned their position based solely on their political affiliation. 
Political patronage leads to inefficiency and corruption over time. Moreover, when police 
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were hired based on their political affiliation, it became difficult for them to resolve 
conflicts with impartiality. The 1883 Pendleton Act prohibited political patronage and 
ordered administrators to make governmental appointment decisions according to merit, 
qualifications, and competence. However, these civil service laws have not been 
completely successful at preventing patronage in law enforcement (Vaughn, 1997). 
In reality, racial minorities are more likely to have negative perceptions of the 
police. Celebrity cases are more likely to affect public perception than low profile, daily 
police encounters with citizens. Also, violence is likely to have a more lasting impact on 
the views of Blacks and Latinos. This is natural; to some extent due to the minority 
psychology. For the most part, however, this is a result of unfortunate police encounters 
with citizens (Tuch & Weitzer, 1997). 
  Cohen defines the vicious causal chain that raises the level of hate between 
police and society, building a disastrous resentment: “A person manifesting a mistrusting 
and disrespectful attitude toward the police is more likely to be harassed and arrested. 
Ultimately, a vicious causal chain forms: abuse of discretion caused by race- and class-
based animus which, in turn, causes disrespect and further abuse of discretion and misuse 
of force.” Police brutality may be the result of any unwarranted police misconduct 
(Cohen, 1996, p.170). 
Phillips and Smith link police violence to the idea of “nation-state.” The state has 
a monopoly on the legitimate use and exercise of power. “The routines, rituals and 
practices of everyday policing” are a result of this monopoly. The physical use of 
unconstitutional power is characterized by the physical harm done to the human body by 
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the use of force. The non-physical use of unconstitutional power includes strictly verbal 
abuse and voice commands to the citizens (Phillips & Smith, 2000, p. 493). Kerstetter 
and his co-authors have reached the same results. Excessive force used by on-duty 
officers can easily be linked to the fact that the state tries to monopolize the use of force 
by using police. It has been found that off-duty officers have a higher standard for the use 
of power than on-duty officers. This finding explains the power to use force (Kestetter et 
al., 1996). 
Swanson, Territo, and Taylor assert that the officers feel a fear of separation from 
service at the end of their careers because they are loosing social status and joining in a 
society that was seen as an enemy in the past. This perception of hostility is a direct result 
of the police subculture that encompasses every officer in the organization (Swanson et 
al., 2001). 
Formal organizations are created to meet certain needs of the society and achieve 
their defined goals. They differ from informal organizations on these points.  Informal 
organizations are established spontaneously to meet the needs of informal groups. 
Furthermore, the goals in formal organizations may be displaced by informal goals that 
have arisen overtime. The informal organization which grows in formal organization may 
reach to a capacity to diminish formal goals of the organization. Especially in police 
agencies, this informal organization is secret and its goals are mostly carried out by 
deviant means (Sherman, 1978). 
Kappeler and co-authors present a very detailed explanation of reasons behind 
police misconduct. According to Kappeler and his colleagues, police deviance is a result 
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of the social conditions of the police and their work environment. Police deviance is not a 
result of the personal trait of individual police officers. Rather, deviance is the result of 
the environment created by the police organization, the community itself, and the way the 
law is made, underscored, and enforced (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Chemerinsky criticized a Board of Inquiry report on the Rampart Scandal of the 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in six points. Two of these criticisms were 
directly related to the police subculture: the problematic nature of the LAPD’s internal 
culture was not addressed in the report and the problems of the LAPD’s disciplinary 
system were underemphasized. Chemerinsky tried to point out one particular element of 
the police subculture, the “code of silence,” which held strong even in a scandalous case 
investigation (Chemerinsky, 2000). 
Bittner states that police officers exhibit a tendency towards silence even amongst 
themselves. Team members speak to each other solely about the work they do. Other 
police officers are subjected to a code of silence as well as the community. It is even 
impossible to find a common code of silence throughout the different teams, rank levels, 
and departments (Bittner, 1974, p. 238). 
Herman Goldstein notes that the code of secrecy among police officers is tighter 
and more absolute than others. The following factors need to be taken into account: 
(1)  The police see themselves as members of a group aligned against common 
enemies. An attack upon any one of their members is considered an attack 
on the group. 
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(2) Officers are greatly dependent upon one another for help in difficult 
situations. If an officer wants to count on fellow officers when his own life 
is endangered, he cannot afford to develop a reputation for “ratting.” 
(3) The police are vulnerable to false allegations. An officer can easily 
imagine himself accused of wrongdoing in a difficult-to-review incident. 
He hopes that his defense of fellow officers when so accused will result in 
their willingness to assist him should their situations be reversed. 
(4)  Police officers are as aware as their administrators of the disparity 
between formal policy and actual practice. The feeling emerges that it is 
necessary to cover up wrongdoing because practices that have developed 
that the police believe to be helpful to the public interest will not stand up 
the scrutiny. 
(5) An officer has no occupational mobility.  He must anticipate continuing to 
work in the same place with the same people. He cannot ordinarily avoid 
an uncomfortable situation by transferring to another agency. He may 
even have to work, at some time in the future, under the supervision of an 
officer whose wrongdoing he observed (Goldstein, 1977. pp.105-106). 
Katz defines the “thin blue line” as an imaginary but effective barrier between 
cops and the public which stems from the necessary and reasonable mistrust police have 
developed towards their fellow citizens. No cop knows “who among us is the next 
predator who will try to take his or her life, the life of a partner, or the life of one of our 
fellow citizens.” To a cop, even routine traffic stops are potentially lethal. In addition to 
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workplace-induced paranoia, cops are psychologically burdened by frequent exposure to 
society’s greatest evils (Gorham, 1997, p. 2). 
There are three approaches that attempt to explain the character of a police 
officer: The psychological, sociological, and anthropological perspectives. The 
psychological paradigm explains character as a static core of personality that remains 
unchanged throughout the life. Some changes in personal attitudes may occur, but the 
core personality traits never change. Scholars claim that individuals with certain personal 
traits choose to apply to enter the police profession, while others with different 
characteristics do not at all (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Alpert and Dunham called psychological approach as predispositional model of 
policing. This model explains that police recruits are more authoritarian than other 
people. Authoritarian people are more conservative, aggressive, cynical, and rigid. They 
see the world as black and white. They see people as either good or bad. They see 
themselves as soldiers of status quo. They are very responsive to superiors and their 
group, but present hostile attitudes towards outsiders. Officers do not analyze their 
obeyance of their group nor the reasons behind their hostility towards outsiders (Kappeler 
et al., 1998). These people are true believers, as Eric Hoffer explained in his book, The 
True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (Hoffer, 1951). 
However, social scientists rejected the idea that a person’s character is fixed. 
Social scientists assert that people are social beings, and their characters are shaped 
through group socialization. This is called the sociological approach.  Professionalization 
is a kind of socialization that teaches individuals to internalize the norms and values of an 
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occupation. All types of training and work experience affect occupational character. This 
approach does not reject the ides that the individuals who became police officers are very 
conservative and homogenous. It rejects the belief that other members of the group do not 
affect the individual’s character. Socialization and the acceptance of group norms take 
time (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
The anthropological explanation of character is also known as the subcultural 
approach. A group may develop a different culture than other groups. The subculture is 
different than the general, dominant culture. Members of a subculture are also the 
members of the general culture. However, they retain unique cultural traits that are not 
extended to all members of the general culture. The differences that distinguish it from 
the dominant culture are qualities that define the subculture. The police subculture 
provides officers a unique role and social status. Some scholars conceptualize the process 
of becoming familiar with the subculture as culturalization (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Inciardi defines the police subculture as “the values and behavior patterns 
characteristic of experienced police officers.”  Subculture, a particular group’s normative 
system, indicates a difference from the dominant culture. Subculture is the result of 
socialization into a group, which suppresses behavior to adhere to certain rules. These 
rules are not written. The can only be learned from experienced members of the group 
(Inciardi, 1999, p. 179). 
 Murano and Hoffer state that omerta rule of organized crime creates a “Blue 
Wall” in the police subculture, which prevents one member from testifying against 
another member of the organization (Murano & Hoffer, 1991, p. 11).  Plaintiffs may face 
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obstacles due to the “code of silence,” when suing a municipality for an alleged 
unconstitutional action of a police officer. The code of silence is an unwritten code that 
prohibits officers from disclosing misconduct by fellow officers or testifying truthfully in 
a case where a fellow officer might be implicated (Lurie, 2000). 
The “us-them” philosophy that police develop towards society may be explained 
by the police worldview. The worldview represents the understandings of a person or a 
group different than the general. The police work environment provides glasses thorough 
which police see the world. These lenses are provided at the beginning of the selection 
process, and mature after acceptance to the group. The selection process, including all 
screening tests, is not necessarily designed to evaluate who does the job better. Rather, 
they are designed to find people who conform to the job, having the required middle class 
values as explained by Sykes and Matza (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
“Techniques of Neutralization” theory is proposed specifically for delinquent 
juvenile, but may be used to understand police justification of deviancy.  Matza and 
Sykes proposed their theory to explain how people justify their deviant acts. These 
justifications are techniques of neutralization that are found in a set of subterranean 
values (Matza & Sykes, 1961). Matza later reformulated this theory, terming it drift 
theory. He uses his drift theory to explain that these techniques of neutralizations provide 
episodic releases from the moral restraints of the society. These neutralization techniques 
are not rationalizations of deviancy. They rationalize the breaking the bonds with society 
and the weakening of psychological suppression. Essentially, the people who use 
neutralizing techniques do not favor deviancy. However, by using these techniques, they 
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are able to engage in deviancy by rationalizing it with neutralizing techniques (Akers, 
2000). By combining these techniques with middle class values, the police officer is 
equipped with a measuring rod to judge who is criminal and should be controlled by the 
state (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Champion agrees with Kappeler and his associates that the police commonly 
rationalize or justify misconduct based on non-legal standards. Champion and Kappeler 
and his co-authors both used Sykes and Matza’s five techniques to explain how police 
justify misconduct (See Table 2) (Matza & Sykes, 1961; Champion, 2001, p. 55; 
Kappeler et al., 1998, pp. 113-125). 
The nature of the police job makes officers believe that societal order is essential, 
their job is noble, and the laws that they enforce are fair and necessary. Those who 
deviate from the norm inherently show disrespect to police authority. Therefore, street 
justice or a zero- tolerance policy is a rational way to deal with those who break the law 
(Keppeler et al., 1998). Even the police officers who believe in community policing 
initiatives view those who do not abide by the law as enemies in the same way that a 
soldier in the field views his enemies (Greene, 1999).  A recent study revealed that 44.6% 
of officers think that police work creates opportunities for misconduct; while 43% of 
officers are disagree with that idea (Hunter, 1999, p. 164). 
A strong degree of suspicion and cynicism are characteristic of the police 
subculture. Anthony V. Bouza argues that, for officers, civilians cannot understand how 
hard it is to deal with the types of people police routinely encounter, including 
sociopaths, drunks, and gang members (Iris, 1998, pp. 2-3 of 18). 
 34
Table 2. Police Techniques of Neutralizing Deviance 
Sykes and Matza’s  Techniques in the 
Neutralization Technique Verbalization Police Context 
 
1. Denial of Responsibility “They made me Police use of excessive force in 
   do it.” arresting a citizen who challenges 
   police authority. 
 
2 Denial of Injury “No innocent Police use of perjury to justify an  
  got hurt.” illegal search. 
 
3. Denial of Victim “They deserved Failure of police to uncover drugs   
  it.” during an illegal search of a“known” 
   drug dealer is rationalized because  
   he didn’t have drugs “this” time. 
 
4. Condemning the ‘They don’t Police rejection of legal and depart-
 Condemners  know anything.” ment control and sanction of deviant 
   behavior. 
 
5. Appeal to Higher “Protect your  Police perjury to protect another 
 Loyalties own.”  officer, destruction of evidence, 
    using punishment for personal 
    justice.     
____________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sykes, G.M. & D. Matza. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization.        
American Sociological Review, 22, 664-670. 
 
According to Herbert, police accept themselves as the opposites of others. The 
others are very dangerous and potentially deadly rivals. They are evil and dirty. Police 
perceive themselves to be the morally upright defenders of society who fight the “bad 
guys”. The police are the thin blue line that separates society not only from law breakers 
but from evil itself (Herbert, 1997, p. 144). Since, the exclusionary rule allows criminals 
to go free, police officers must take care of the streets to make them safe for the 





Policing is a unique profession, one that is different in many ways from other 
professions. Police may use their discretionary power to exceed the limits of the law. It is 
not rare to see examples of the excessive use of power, even in very simple situations. 
The police subculture, the us versus them rhetoric, the idea of a nation-state, the code of 
silence, a weak disciplinary system, the social conditions of the police and their working 
environment, and the paramilitary structure of police agencies are just a few of the factors 
that lead police officers to assert excessive force in unlawful encounters with citizenry. 
Ordinarily, scholars view most police misconduct cases as reflex actions. 
However, since police represents the governmental authority, there is no justification for 
their fault. Despite the fact that the individual police officer is a product of the society, 
police should not respond to violence with violence. Police should be trained and 
mandated to handle the job professionally. The professionalism mentioned in that chapter 
consists of both the scientific and artistic aspects of policing. Some scholars think that 
policing may not be taught scientifically. However, policing is both a science and art. Its 
minimum educational requirements that are taught in schools are the scientific aspects of 
policing, the law classes and the Supreme Court rulings. On the other hand, policing is an 
art. The same laws are enforced among different individuals and groups. Policing is not a 
profession carried out in a battle field, but it is a profession that is designed to protect and 
to serve the public. 
The biggest problem in policing practices is the disparity between formal policy 
and actual practice. The thin blue wall is also vulnerable to false allegations. This makes 
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police officers depend upon each other and develop a unique subculture that supports a 
code of silence and corruption. While the previous sections of this chapter try to 
understand why police are sometimes acting out of the limits of the law, it should not be 
forgotten that they are also the targets of outlaws.  The law should protect vulnerable 
officers from being targeted by outlaws unfairly, while holding unruly officers 
responsible of their misconduct.  
All of the psychological, sociological, and anthropological explanations for police 
character legitimately explain why the behavior of police officers sometimes deviates 
from the law. These deviations should be addressed in training and in research. The 
tendency to justify misconduct with neutralizing techniques should be a topic discussed 
in training; these new neutralizing techniques should be refuted in a logical manner.  
There is no single cause for police misconduct. It is a complex issue that should 















RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Introduction 
This chapter will address the control mechanisms of police misconduct in the 
United States of America. This chapter will not cover all the mechanisms mentioned 
previously, but will cover the most important ones that address the problem. The logic 
behind the classification of the control mechanisms is mentioned in Table 1 (see page 
10). These mechanisms are classified as either internal or external controls of police 
misconduct. 
Internal Controls 
Standards and Training 
An outsider looking in on police organizations may observe several factors which 
cause a law to be misinterpreted and implemented in a way that the legislature did not 
intend. Factors such as organizational standards, codes, values, and subculture determine 
how laws are implemented. They also are the main determinants of police deviancy that 
permit and lead officers to act outside the limits of the law. Initial police training is very 
important to prepare a police recruit, furnishing him with the basic knowledge needed to 
handle the police job before being trained in the department. If the core values of the 
police profession are not provided at this initial training phase, there is an imminent 
danger that rights of the citizens may be violated (Charles, 2000). 
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Most scholars agree that civil litigation may result from both administrative 
decision-making and the individual officer’s actions. The purpose of education and 
training is to minimize police-citizen interactions and lawsuits raised against the police. 
The State of Texas has considerably minimized civil litigation and damages to police 
agencies by mandating forty hours of leadership and law enforcement management 
training for police chiefs. This regulation varies by state. In Texas, the Law Enforcement 
Management Institute, trains police chiefs regularly (Vaughn, Cooper, & del Carmen, 
2001). Traditional police training was based on the experiences of officers in the past, 
their relations with superiors, their relations with partners, and the need to follow the 
orders of superiors without making any comment or questioning them (Kappeler et al., 
1998).  Police training is a type of socialization where occupational behavior and the 
requirements of police work are learned (Skolnick, 1994). A vast number of civil law 
suits have been filed asserting that police misconduct led to the injury of citizens or their 
families, forcing departments to look over their police conduct policies and training 
procedures (Champion, 2001). 
Harris saw police training as a tool that could be used for reform. He stated that 
necessary ideological changes in police organizations can be achieved by changing the 
way officers are initially trained. Academy training was seen as a tool of solidarity to 
make consistent the behavior of the officers in the field. This type of education would 
lessen the vulnerability of officers to the hazards of the job. The police officer would 
have learned in the academy about the standard procedures that ought to be applied to 
certain situations (Harris, 1973). 
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Today, criminal justice experts revised their opinions on the role of the academy. 
Kappeler called police training the “nuts and bolts” of “how to do” the police job. 
However, he advocated supplementing traditional academy training with a formal 
education. Police training should include improving the problem-solving and critical 
thinking capacities of the officers (Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 221). 
The Turkish National Police Academy training has used this approach for years. 
The main recruiting source used by the Police Academy is the Police College, which is a 
high school. The Police Academy curriculum includes both education and training 
classes. Moreover, the Police Academy training of the Turkish National Police continues 
for four years. The first two years of training cover legal topics ranging from an 
introduction to law to the Constitution. In the third year, policing classes are mixed with 
the law classes. In the last year, the classes are decided by the Directorate General of the 
TNP according to the needs of the organization in specific policing areas. Police 
Academy education and training very successfully prepares future police managers with 
analytical thinking skills (Police Academy, 2002). 
Education and training together can reform police organizations. The 
“Professional standards” office replaced “internal affairs.” This was not only a change in 
the title of the office; it was also a change in the mentality of police organizations. This 
change came with college-educated police administrators. Thibault sees police deviancy 
as more than just an organizational problem. The police are also accountable to the 
public. The professional standards divisions of police agencies investigate the offenses 
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committed by police officers that are defined as “misconduct” by departmental duty 
manuals (Thibault, 2001). 
The US Commission on Civil Rights suggests that police training includes 
programs to teach community-sensitive training in changing environments. Effective 
community relations and the creation of a safe and sound society is a function of good 
police training. As Fyfe recommends, the priorities of police job should shift from crime 
fighting to order maintenance. Since officers are more eager and receptive in their initial 
training, changes in basic training make a big difference in how the police functions (as 
cited in US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000). 
The Civil Rights Commission contends that consent decrees based on 42 USC § 
14141 would help police training meet federal standards. The effective side of consent 
decree is that a city may enter into consent decree without admitting the violations 
alleged by Justice Department and may increase quality of training without harming the 
police agency. All examples of consent decrees mandate enhancements in police training. 
Inadequate training is a danger when an officer has to make an immediate decision in life 
threatening situations. Adequate training prepares police officers to act properly without 
creating a danger to him or to society. As Fyfe expresses to the Commission, unrealistic 
safety concerns of police officers lead them to an aggressive and excessive use of 
unnecessary force on the citizens. (US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000). 
Bayley and Bittner assert that police training should not include tactics developed 
based on scientific certainty because policing cannot be taught scientifically. Police 
should be trained to act properly in diverse situations (Bayley & Bittner, 1989). 
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A recent study revealed that 86 % of officers think that better training would be a 
good way to regulate police conduct. About 11 % of officers disagree with that idea. A 
full 95 % of officers agree that clear and effective policies and procedures will be 
followed (Hunter, 1999, p. 164). 
Thibault and his coauthors argue that insufficient training may place 
communication barriers between police and society, cause unnecessary harm to the 
public, and foster immorality among officers. Insufficient training may then cause bad 
publicity and loss of resources due to an increase in civil litigation against the police. The 
training issue is a large part of the 42 USC §1983 (Section 1983) civil liability suits. 
According to § 1983, municipalities are open to civil liability suits because of their 
officers’ negligence and intentional wrongdoing. In these civil liability cases, state and 
municipal governments became civil defendants. Traditional training aims to help 
improve recruits improve at skills necessary to handle the job, and to socialize the officer 
with a new series of routines and protocols. Training is very important for managers, 
because a well-trained officer does the job without causing any problems to superiors or 
the agency. Inadequate training increases the bureaucratic red tape in an agency, pulling 
police away from their regular duties. As a result, morale decreases and job frustration 
among officers increases (Thibault, 2001). 
The character of peace officers can be shaped by education. Education is the most 
important reality of society. No one is born with a formed character. Character can be 
reformed later in life (Delattre, 1989, p. 7). 
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Melton mentions the inadequate training of police officers in the NYPD, thorough 
the words of the Deputy Commissioner of the NYPD. There is a need to train officers to 
exercise self-control, using violence only when it is warranted (Melton, 1989, p. 3 of 8). 
Herbert states that “to avoid the ad hoc decision making of boss-dependent 
policing, these more professional officers would be beholden instead to a well-regulated 
bureaucratic order administered by a powerful chief insulated from city politics” 
(Herbert, 1997, pp. 59-60). 
Goldstein argues that police should hire college-educated employees because 
college experience will produce a better police officer (p. 286).  In addition, a college 
education could provide a better foundation for a more practical management (Goldstein, 
1977, p. 304). 
A police agency’s book of written rules is sometimes called by different names, 
but this book varies little in spirit or in essence. A “duty manual” may also be referred to 
as an “operations manual,” or “the procedures manual.” It may also be referred to as 
simply a collection of “rules and regulations,” or “standard operating procedures.” 
Regardless of what it is called, the duty manual outlines the rules that govern officers 
while they are on duty and even in their off-duty hours” (Thibault, 2001, p. 125). 
A police agency defines its role in the duty manual as well. This definition of 
roles and rules is essential in two ways. First of all, police officers learn what their roles 
are and what is expected from them, allowing them to act without hesitation. Second, by 
making the duty manual available to the public, police give the citizenry the opportunity 
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to learn about the standards of the police. The duty manual also should include the 
mission, goals, and priorities of a police agency (CALEA, 1996).  
Policing standards are explained in duty manuals. A duty manual should neither 
be so simple that it leaves too much room for discretion, nor so complicated that it overly 
bureaucratizes the police agency. Thibault summarizes that the rules in a duty manual 
should: 
1. be kept short so that everyone can read and understand the entire 
manual in a relatively short time span, 
2. be consistent, 
3. be reasonable, 
4. conform to principles of good management, 
5. be humane, 
6. be enforceable, 
7. be stated in an unambiguous manner, 
8. be related to the actual operations of police procedures, 
9. not deal with the trivial, and 
10. be written in a good English format with a professional tone to the 
choice of words (Thibault, 2001, pp. 128-129). 
Bozeman and Rainey lays the blame for improprieties on everyone and no one in 
an agency. They give several examples to demonstrate that the insufficiency is not with 
the personnel, but with the system itself in most cases. However, the say that the people 
create the systems and people are the systems. The authors compared the public and 
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private sectors regarding the rules of the organizations. What they found contradicts the 
common belief. According to them, private sector managers prefer more rules than public 
sector managers. Neither people in the public sector, nor the government is inherently 
incompetent. However, incompetence is more a product of the rules and regulations of 
the organizations, not individual persons (Bozeman & Rainey, 1998). 
One Supreme Court case in particular, Monell v. New York Department of Social 
Services spurred police departments to develop police standards. The Supreme Court held 
that a human rights violation committed by an employee might be tied to the employer if 
poor training or a lack of supervision caused the violation. In every area including use of 
deadly force, police agencies have been improving their policies by incorporating the 
federal reasonableness standard as well as state mandates. Despite the fact that these 
standards vary among different police agencies, it is fair to say that the situation is now 
better than it was in 1980’s (US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000). 
A recent study has revealed that if a police agency’s policy mandates that 
supervisors report use of force incidents, the rate of use of force by police officers 
declines. This shows that the organizational structure and duty manuals of police 
organizations affect officer behavior (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001). There are other 
restraints that weaken the effectiveness of duty manuals. Buchanan points out the fact 
that a well-written policy will not help to impose policies if officers do not know the 
policy or how to apply it. The policy must be clear and comprehensive. Stronger policies 
make a deterrent effect on police misconduct (Buchanan, 1993). 
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In conclusion, the policy manuals of police agencies should be clear and concise. 
More importantly, they should serve as a guide both for officers and the public regarding 
how to act in certain situations. They should be available and understandable to the 
public as well. They should outline the standards of policing, defining the rights and 
obligations of police officers. Police manuals should be used in training programs. 
Training should be adequate enough to prepare officers for the future tasks. 
Internal Review Boards 
Internal Review Boards are responsible for receiving, processing, and 
investigating complaints against police officers.  These complaints may be for violations 
of criminal law or agency policies and procedures. Approaches vary among Internal 
Affairs divisions (IAD’s). Some actively investigate police misconduct and corruption, 
while others investigate only in response to complaints received (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Inciardi asserts that there are two types of approaches that police may use to assert 
control over officer behavior: preventive and punitive control. Internal affairs divisions 
fall under the punitive control approach. The size of IAD’s may vary from one officer to 
an entire division in the agency. IAD’s are charged with the investigation of allegations 
of police misconduct, officer involved shootings, and situations where weapons are 
discharged (Inciardi, 1999, pp. 247-248). 
Reform initiatives within police departments tend to arise after big scandals. At 
the core of these achievements or ideas, internal affairs units take a unique position. Most 
scandals are typically seen as the result of weak control over police and weak or biased 
internal disciplining boards. Most reform efforts focus on internal affairs divisions as a 
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result of this distrust in most American police agencies. Ineffectiveness and lack of role 
clarity in disciplining procedures has channeled reform activities, involving outside 
parties in the process. The public has come to believe that IAD’s do not investigate 
complaints of civilians effectively. The role of IAD’s was uncertain to the public. 
Moreover, unrest is prevalent among officers who have observed unequal applications of 
IAD’s. At the center of these criticisms is the lack of accurate record keeping for 
disciplining procedures. It is impossible to track officers who are disciplined using these 
records. It is recommended that IAD’s should continue with their mission, modifying 
their procedures to ensure equitable treatment of officers, keep the public more informed, 
computerize record keeping, and address how to avoid the pitfall of the code of silence 
(US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000). 
Mellon thinks that the legitimate use of power that police are allowed inspires 
corruption. People may choose to become officers in search of power. Do police officers 
use physical force easily or refrain from it unless it is necessary (Mollen, 1998)? The 
Christopher Commission did a study of the use of excessive force within the LAPD. It 
found that the excessive use of force was not a product of departmental policy. In fact, 
small number of officers was using excessive force: 33.2% of abusive power cases were 
held by 10% of officers. Is the LAPD responsible for this 10 %? The reality is that 44 % 
of officers who abused citizens were not disciplined by the LAPD (ACLU, 1997). 
There is a strongly held belief that most of the brutal police officers are not 
prosecuted or disciplined. The greatest barrier to prosecution or disciplinary action 
appears as a “code of silence” among officers. When no one talks, it is very hard to prove 
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misconduct cases. In most instances, the complainant was an arrestee, and the abuse has 
to be proven through medical records because there are no visible signs of brutality 
(Amnesty International, 1996). 
A disciplinary procedure may take the form of an unpleasant task at best, and it 
can create morale problems and lawsuits at worst (Guthrie, 1996).  According to Iris, 
police misconduct complaints of citizens are not handled properly when the police 
internal affairs unit officers carry out the investigation. Police cannot truly investigate 
themselves especially if the subject matter is excessive use of power. Only a civilian 
review board can reach a correct and true decision to hold the police accountable for their 
misconduct. However, the power to discipline police officers is very crucial to police 
managers. Disciplining officers is the only administrative tool that can be used to control 
them (Iris, 1998). 
 Supervision is very important aspect of policing. Lack of supervision makes 
police officers totally free in their behaviors. If police officers know that there is zero 
tolerance, they will behave how they are expected to behave. They should understand that 
there will be zero tolerance if they use excessive force (Mollen, 1998). The Christopher 
Commission found, subsequent to its study, that the LAPD had, in effect, condoned 
officer brutality by being lax in its supervision and inadequately investigating complaints. 
By placing police officers alone in a patrol car and giving them a very expansive patrol 
area, the department, in essence, leaves officers unsupervised. Officers can easily 
maintain “low visibility” and avoid scrutiny from supervisors (Livingston, 1999). 
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Awareness of the law assures people that their unlawful act or omission will be 
punished with a certain sanction. They will then be very careful not to violate the rules 
and regulations. However, the lack of supervision and lack of sanctions for misconduct 
encourage police officers to use excessive force. It is the responsibility of police 
leadership and city government leadership to establish internal control that will minimize 
the use of excessive force and brutality within the department (Mollen, 1998). The 
bureaucratic structure of police agencies provides very weak control over officer 
discretion. Police act at the street level and it is sometimes impossible to supervise 
personnel in the street. Decisions are made on the street, and police managers are often 
ambiguous about misconduct. Consequently, the decisions officers make on the streets 
are rarely reviewed by supervisors (Shellenberg, 2000). 
 There is a potential danger in giving supervisory personnel unlimited 
responsibility when investigating misconduct in police agencies. However, outside 
control is imminent if administrators are unwilling to deal with brutality and corruption 
more aggressively and forthrightly (Goldstein, 1977). 
 First of all, the police must provide a fair and easygoing system to file the 
complaints of citizens who feel they have been mistreated. It is essential that all 
complaints are investigated speedily and that the complainant is kept informed at all 
times. Accordingly, the officer against whom the complaints are filed should be informed 





42 USC Section 1983 
State and Federal tort laws differ from criminal laws. A tort is a civilly wrongful 
action that causes an injury to a person or property in violation of a duty imposed by law. 
Most State tort laws are interpretations of common law by the courts. However, Congress 
must pass federal tort laws, because the civil wrong should be defined clearly. Section 
1983 is a federal tort law that was statutorily created (del Carmen et al., 2001). USC 42, 
Sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 are the federal civil laws that can be applied to individual 
police officers and agencies. Section 1983 is the law most frequently used in cases of 
police misconduct that cause the deprivation of civil rights. This Section is also known as 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Section 1983 was a reaction of Congress to the Ku Klux Klan due to the 
ineffectiveness and weaknesses the states had demonstrated on such crimes. Pursuant to 
the 14th Amendment, the Congress enacted Section 1983 to remedy civil rights violations 
in federal courts. This legislation was the result of the distrust to state courts. However, 
the Supreme Court did not use Section 1983 until 1961 after the Civil War. In Monroe v. 
Pape (1961:167) the Supreme Court decided to recognize the deprivation of rights under 
color of state law as a violation of Section 1983, and looked for the specific intent to 
deprive a person of a federal right. Municipalities were then immune from liability under 
Section 1983. However, the Court, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of 
New York (1978:658) established a direct liability to municipalities, where the violation 
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was caused as a result of policy, practice, or custom (Barrineau, 1994; Whitebread & 
Slobogin, 2001; Taylor, 1999). 
USC 42 § 1983 states: 
 
“§ 1983.  Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia.” 
This act was an addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and allowed citizens to 
sue for civil damages for the deprivation of federally guaranteed rights. There is a 
massive debate about Section 1983 due to its widespread impact on police officers. This 
is a civil recourse that allows private parties to sue any official who is acting in an official 
capacity (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
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In addition to remedying constitutional violations, Section 1983 is used to 
override some State laws, when a state law is inadequate, or when it is adequate but 
inapplicable (Worrall, 2001). 
Section 1983 is the statute chosen to sue police officials for two reasons: (1) 
discovery procedures are more liberal than other suits, and (2) attorney fees can be 
recovered under this lawsuit (Taylor, 1999; Worrall, 2001; Whitebread & Slobogin, 
2000). 
Section 1983 allows citizens to sue in civil court for deprivation of their federally 
guaranteed rights. The plaintiff has to prove two things: The officer was “acting under the 
color of law,” and the result(s) of the officer’s “act deprived the plaintiff of his rights.” 
The right that the plaintiff is deprived of should be protected under the US Constitution 
or any federal law. The “under color of law” requirement includes acts that exceed the 
lawful authority of the officer’s jurisdiction. The 14th Amendment is the main source 
used to decide which Constitutional rights are deprived. The right subjected to a 1983 
action should be a right protected under the federal Constitution or federal law. A right 
given under a state law is not protected by Section 1983 (del Carmen et al., 2001; Vaughn 
& Coomes, 1995; Whitebread & Slobogin, 2000).  Some scholars argue that a third 
element was added to first two elements: “deliberate indifference” of the municipality 
and its policymakers. “Deliberate indifference” is used here to mean a conscious or 
reckless disregard of the consequences of one's acts or omissions (Taylor, 1999). Since 
Section 1983 aims to reach the deep pocket of municipalities rather than the individual 
officer, a litigant must establish that the governmental agency was “in conscious 
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disregard,” “deliberately indifferent,” or “shocked the conscience” (Kappeler et al., 
1998). 
While a sworn officer is acting under the color of State law, if he or she allegedly 
deprives the 4th Amendment Constitutional rights of a person, that officer can be sued in 
federal court. The officer can be either a state or municipality employee. Federal officers 
can be sued under the provisions of Section 1983 with a Bivens Action (Swanson et al., 
2001). 
The most effective and acceptable part of the 1983 actions is the “municipal 
fault.” Showing the existence of a “policy or custom” can prove this fault. The plaintiff 
can sue the municipality on the basis of three different manifestations of negligence: 
1- A facially illegal policy that is either codified or adopted by the municipality. 
To hold the municipality responsible there should be clear intent behind this 
regulation and it should have a causal link to the harm done. 
2- Tolerance by the local government of an illegal action in the absence of a 
codified policy when a municipal fault exists. While there is no written 
regulation, if the municipality is tolerating an illegal action or disregarding a 
known risk or unknown but obvious risk, than it can be held responsible for 
“deliberate indifference.” 
3- “Final policy making authority” analysis. A ruling by a policy-making body 
that directly orders an act violates an individual’s rights. The plaintiff should 
prove that the final policy making body ruled the action. It is very hard to hold 
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responsible city councils where they consist of several members, if they are 
not in mutual decision to do so (Brown, 1999, footnote 57). 
G. Flint Taylor offers suggestions on what to look for to hold a municipality 
responsible. First, the constitutional violation at issue should be caused by a municipal 
policy, practice or custom. This municipal policy, practice or custom should not be 
necessarily written. It can be de facto, or established by a municipal official who is the 
final policy-maker on the issue at hand. It should be noted that a single unconstitutional 
act alone is not enough to be defined as a policy, practice, or custom, unless it is linked to 
the final policy-maker. Liability under Section 1983 is monetary only, due to the fact that 
a municipality is a juristic person. Practically speaking, it is not possible to imprison a 
municipality or apply any sanctions to it other than monetary sanctions. A municipality 
cannot be held responsible for punitive damages (Taylor, 1999). 
It is impossible to open a case if an officer’s action cannot be proven to be taken 
under color of law. The “under color of law” requirement limits the use of Section 1983 
to a relatively few cases. The US District Court decided in Calhoun v. Doster (1971:736) 
that the blatantly intimidating actions of state officials are “under color of law” if they 
infringe upon the federally guaranteed rights of citizens. One another issue is the position 
of officer between parties. If an officer is taking the side of one party against other, he is 
acting with police power and his action is under “color of law” (Vaughn & Coomes, 
1995). 
In Section 1983, Monell claims have an important role. In 1978, the Supreme 
Court decided in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York (1978:658) that 
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the legislature intended Section 1983 to apply to municipalities and other local 
governmental units (Swanson et al., 2001). Before Monell, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Section 1983 according to the precedents set by Common Law, where juristic bodies 
would never commit a wrong, because it was not possible for the Queen to be wrong. 
There are three reasons to bring Monell claims under Section 1983. The first is to 
“reach the municipal deep pocket.” Secondly, the case takes “a direct path to a 
municipality,” where an officer commits a constitutional violation and cannot be sued 
because of immunity. Lastly, it is discovered that there is “systemic evidence of 
deliberate indifference” to police brutality. A Monell claim in a police brutality case may 
be the only way to take some type of action against the brutal officer who is immune 
from suit. Monell claims are a tool that can be used to develop systemic evidence of 
deliberate indifference to police brutality. Actually, they are the only tool that can be used 
to investigate the attitudes of police officials concerning the disciplinary issues of 
“repeater” police officers (Taylor, 1999). 
There are controversies surrounding Section 1983, mainly having to do with the 
ambiguities of terms such as “color of law” and “deliberate indifference.” The plaintiff 
has to prove a failure to discipline, the existence of a “code of silence,” the existence of 
prior complaints against the officer in question, and how these elements are related to the 
cause of the injury (Taylor, 1999). 
In Screws v. United States (1945:91), the Supreme Court interpreted under 
“color” of law as under “pretense” of law. According to this, if officers are in pursuit of 
their personal interests, there is no way to make a Monell claim. If they are undertaking 
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their official duties and subsequently cause an unconstitutional injury to a private party, 
then a Monell claim can be made. It has been held by Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape 
(1965:365-167) that the misuse of authority by officers should be considered under color 
of law. Before Monroe, the misconduct of officers was considered to be outside the scope 
of lawful authority. There was no way to sue juristic bodies due to their officers’ 
unconstitutional acts. Monroe overturned this application and enabled citizens to raise a 
case against the misconduct of officers. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court held in Pitchell v. Callan (1994:548) that the “color 
of law” test does not require checking whether the officer was recorded in the duty roster. 
The determining factor is not the duty status of the officer, but the nature of his act. 
Justices in this case defined an officer to be acting under color of law when he invokes 
his police powers, discharges duties routinely associated with police work, or uses his 
authority to trap plaintiffs in compromising positions. More specifically, if officers are 
uniformed, pull out their guns, identify themselves as police, arrest suspects, make 
official reports, or provide other indications that they are acting as an officer in an official 
capacity, that officer is acting under color of law. 
Vaughn and Coomes conducted a study examining ninety-six law enforcement 
cases to decide whether an officer was acting under color of law. They found that officers 
are acting under color of law when one or more of the following seven conditions are 
satisfied: 
(1) they identify themselves as officers; 
(2) they perform criminal investigations; 
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(3) they file official police documents; 
(4) they make arrests; 
(5) they invoke police powers in or outside their jurisdiction; 
(6) they settle personal vendettas with police power; or 
(7) they display weapons or police equipment (Vaughn & Coomes, 1995, p. 409). 
It should be noted that Vaughn and Coomes found it very ironic that a civil court 
deciding on a Section 1983 case should determine whether an agent/officer was acting 
under color of law as a first step. The authors suggest that reviewing courts should 
determine first, whether the act of an officer violated a federally guaranteed right. If they 
find that a right was violated, then they should decide whether the act was committed 
under color of law (Vaughn & Coomes, 1995). 
There are four common types of Monell claims: 
(1) An affirmative pattern of misconduct and/or municipal indifference to it. 
(2) Cases in which misconduct is a direct result of common practice. 
(3) Cases where the final decision maker is involved in the misconduct. 
(4) Cases where the municipality’s failure is systemic, involving inadequate 
practices of hiring, training, supervising, disciplining, monitoring, counseling, 
or controlling officers (Taylor, 1999, p. 2 of 13). 
Taylor thinks that Monell claims under Section 1983 give citizens the chance to 
act as a “private attorney general.” The claims under Section 1983 target individual 
officers and are far away from correcting the whole department. However, these claims 
serve as an indication of the “practice and pattern” that may give way to Section 14141 
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claims by the Attorney General for or in the name of the United States. It very effectively 
deters police misconduct and positively affects police policies and practices. Section 
14141 is studied in depth in Chapter 4 as a potential model for the Turkish National 
Police. Additionally, claims made under Section 1983 are very effective in educating the 
public, showing individuals how to pursue their rights (Taylor, 1999). However, it should 
be noted that there is a "highly complex body of interpretive law" that has followed 
Monell (Hamilton, 1999). According to Taylor there are positive and negative aspects of 
Monell claims under Section 1983. Positively speaking, they: 
a. broaden the scope of admissibility at trial. 
b. facilitate holding supervisors and command officials responsible. 
c. allow litigators to distribute the responsibility between the individual officer 
and municipality.  
On the negative side, Monell claims contribute to: 
a. Increased costs of litigation.  
b. Expanded attorney time. 
c. Increased opposition efforts. 
d. Increased length and complexity of the trial (Taylor, 1999, p. 2 of 13). 
Police supervisors and administrators should define when and where police 
officers are on duty and when and where they are not. In most countries of the world, 
including the US and Turkey, police officers are deemed on duty without making any 
shift distinction. Moreover, this is expanded for the Turkish National Police by 
mentioning that regardless of place and time, the police are on duty twenty-four hours a 
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day in the limits of the city where they are assigned. White clearly indicates the need to 
define more clearly the status of officers in their off time. These civil liability cases will 
lead supervisors and administrators to evaluate the duty situation of police again (White 
2000). The best defense to civil liability cases is clear policies and regular training and 
certification programs (Vaughn & Coomes, 1995). 
Del Carmen summarizes the methods officers can use to minimize lawsuits: 
1. Know and follow the department’s manual or guidelines to ensure a strong 
claim to a good faith defense. 
2. Act within the scope of professional duties. 
3. Act in a professional and responsible manner at all times. When faced with a 
difficult situation, use reason instead of emotion. 
4. Know the constitutional rights of the public and respect them. 
5. Consult legal counsel or a supervisor when in doubt, and document the 
advice given. 
6. In sensitive cases, document activities, and keep good written records. 
7. Establish and maintain good relations with the community. 
8. Keep well informed on current issues and trends in civil and criminal 
liability cases (del Carmen, 2000, p. 439). 
Section 1983 has been said to be ineffective at proving police brutality cases. 
However, it is still an important tool that can be used to discover massive brutality 
problems (Amnesty International, 1996). 
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There are several approaches that can be used to defend an agency against a 1983 
Action. Two defenses in particular have proven successful. The first of these is the “good 
faith defense.” The Supreme Court ruled in Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982; 800) that an 
officer is not liable in civil maters if he or she acted in good faith. That is he or she did 
not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person 
would have been aware of. The good faith defense places some burden officers and 
agencies. The officers must learn and know the basic constitutional and federal rights 
provided to citizens. The agency must update their officers about changes in Supreme 
Court holdings and update their manuals accordingly. 
The second commonly used defense against 1983 actions is “the probable cause 
defense in Fourth Amendment cases.” If there is probable cause, then the officer is not 
liable. This defense is used only in Fourth Amendment violations, because the Fourth 
Amendment requires the police to act with probable cause or with a recognized exception 
to it (del Carmen 2000, pp.  422-424). 
The aim of 1983 lawsuits is to uncover inadequate administrative controls, 
deficient policies, or customs or practices that are improper or illegal. Section 1983 may 
be a very effective tool to force departments to change their policies and correct them 
accordingly (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
Ironically, the burden of 1983 Actions is passed on to taxpayers. In New York 
City alone, from 1987 to 1991, civil cases alleging police misconduct rose 53%, while the 
money the courts awarded in 1988 was $7 million, it rose to $24 million in 1994 
(Amnesty International, 1996). 
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As a conclusion, Section 1983 is a tort litigation that targets both individual police 
officers and their agencies. It is a monetary remedy for whose civil rights are deprived of 
unlawfully. The act that deprived persons of their rights should be done under the color of 
law. Section 1983 has very much debate on it. Its terms are still vague. However, since it 
tries to reach municipal deep pocket, it may be a pushing force to reform police agencies. 
Criminal Prosecution 
 The statutes enforced by the Civil Rights Division of the United States 
Department of Justice vary by area, but official misconduct is enforced through 18 USC. 
§ 241 and 18 USC. § 242.  Title 18 USC. § 241 is a civil rights conspiracy statute and 
makes it unlawful for two or more persons to deprive citizens of constitutional rights. 
This is mostly concerned with 18 USC Section 242. 
18 USC. § 242 provides that: 
“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, 
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, ... shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury 
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or 
fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; 
and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such 
acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an 
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attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined 
under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be 
sentenced to death.” 
A criminal remedy is brought under 18 USC. Section 242. Section 242 imposes a 
federal penalty to anyone under color of state law who willfully deprives someone of his 
constitutional rights. This criminal action seems similar to § 1983. Despite the similarity 
of causes of action, § 242 is different than § 1983, because § 242 is a criminal remedy 
and pursued stricter than § 1983. However, §242 needs a specific intent to violate a 
person’s constitutional rights. Since most prosecutors are not willing to prosecute the 
police, § 242 remains as an ineffective tool. Only very few cases are investigated and 
prosecuted because of a lack of sufficient resources and the specific intent requirement 
(Walker, 1992; Whitebread & Slobogin,  2000; US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000; 
Amnesty International, 1996). 
Stone summarizes the prosecutor’s role in its historical context, stating that 
prosecuting the police is very rare due to several reasons. First of all, it is generally the 
case that there are insufficient resources to prosecute police misconduct cases. As a 
corollary of this general lack of resources, the prosecution of police misconduct cases 
requires a number of well-trained, highly specialized misconduct investigators. In most 
jurisdictions there are no such personnel. Moreover, even if a police officer is prosecuted, 
getting a conviction is difficult and very rare (Stone, 1998). 
As a rule of thumb, the prosecutor is the chief law enforcement officer. However, 
this role has never been explored to its full extent. The role of the prosecutor comes into 
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question when a police operation is likely to result in criminal prosecution. Despite the 
fact that most activities of the police fall outside criminal prosecution, police and 
prosecutors develop improving a close working relationship with each other. This close 
affinity affects the prosecutor’s ability to prosecute officers who commit a crime 
(President’s Commission, 1986). 
Stone mentions that the police are accountable to their commanders all around the 
world. In democracies, however, the police should be accountable to some other outside 
parties as well. The outside controllers may vary, but commonly they include the 
legislature, the press, associations of citizens, and the law. The difference comes to light 
when citizens have a right to expect that the police should not only enforce the law, but 
also respect it. The role of the prosecutor enters into play in that moment if the police do 
not respect the law. As mentioned earlier, the prosecution of police is very rare and 
requires highly specialized agent. Most state authorities are not able to handle this task 
due to their lack of resources. However, the Civil Rights Division of the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is an exception to that statement. The DOJ has prosecutors 
permanently assigned to prosecute police misconduct cases. Their experience in police 
misconduct cases enables them to make the police accountable to the law. However, this 
division is not the primary body that oversees police misconduct. Their role begins when 
the first wave of oversight primary oversight mechanisms, such as the city and state 
prosecutors, fail to hold the police responsible for their misconduct (Stone, 1998). 
The Civil Rights division has two main tools to combat police misconduct. These 
are criminal prosecution and civil litigation. Until the 1994 Violent Crime Control and 
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Law Enforcement Act, the Division generally used criminal prosecution as a means to 
combat police misconduct. After this Act was passed, another tool was provided to the 
Division: “the ability to take civil action against governmental authorities that have 
unlawful policies or engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives individuals of 
their rights.” If used, criminal prosecution is very effective remedy against police 
misconduct. It allows authorities to demonstrate in successful cases that police abusive 
power is intolerable, especially against minorities (Agathocleous, 1998). 
Due to the rarity of criminal prosecution, the ability to take civil action against a 
pattern or practice of a governmental agency was added as a remedy. However, only 
twenty out of 9,168 attorneys deal with police misconduct cases and they are not able to 
prosecute every police misconduct case. The cases that they do handle are selected 
according to their importance and the number of victims who suffer from violation. Non-
egregious cases are not taken care of due to a lack of resources and personnel. Most cases 
documented on paper as a matter of bureaucratic routine, but do not reach an end 
(Agathocleous, 1998). 
Due to the vast amounts of common law limitations on police misconduct cases at 
the state level, state prosecution is rare. Most state laws require the existence of the 
andagainst cases of police misconduct (Whitebread & Slobogin, 2000). 
In addition to these weaknesses, individual misconduct cases cannot eliminate 
police misconduct at the organizational level because of the abusive subculture of police 
departments. So, the effect of individual criminal prosecution is very marginal and does 
not eliminate police abuses at large. As an example, in the 1970’s, the Division tried a 
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squad team of Philadelphia police who threatened an innocent civilian to confess about 
the arson related murder of a family. Despite the fact that the Division won its case, the 
sentence of the court never affected the department as a whole, because Rizzo, the Chief 
of Police, refused to suspend said officers. He rationalized that the officers were innocent 
unless the Supreme Court proved their conviction. 
Individual cases, then, are not enough bring police departments around to lawful 
action. The Philadelphia situation led prosecutors of the Division to take other actions. 
They turned to city and police managers with allegations of failure to train and discipline, 
stating that they allowed misconduct to occur.  The case was taken up in civil court, and 
the charges were broadened to institution-wide misconduct. This time, the Division was 
not successful, but they did not stop. They tried to make the legislature allow the Division 
to litigate governmental bodies in civil lawsuits. The Congress rejected this request two 
times, in 1980 and in 1991. In 1994, Congress changed its position and allowed the 
Division to bring civil cases against governmental bodies. Today, the Division still brings 
criminal prosecutions against individual officers due to its specific and general deterrent 
effect on police officers. It also helped to restore the public’s confidence in the law 
(Agathocleous, 1998). 
The criminal prosecution of police misconduct requires the threat or use of force. 
Other differences between criminal prosecutions and civil litigation are shown in Table 3 
(US DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2002). 
Jacobi thinks that as a result of the rarity of prosecutions of police officers, the 
equal treatment clause requirement is not met. The rarity of prosecution is a result of 
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either the police code of silence or the close affinity of prosecutors with the police. 
Section 242 was enacted as a result of the states’ ineffectiveness at pursuing prosecutions 
for state level police misconduct; however, it seems that Section 242 has also become an 
ineffective tool (Jacobi, 2000). 
Table 3. The Differences Between a Civil and a Criminal Civil Rights Violation 
 
 CRIMINAL CIVIL 
Who is charged Accused person Usually an organization 
Standard of proof Beyond a reasonable doubt Preponderance of evidence 
Fact finder Jury Judge 
Victim Identified individuals 
Individuals and/or 
representatives of a group 
or class 
Remedy sought Prison, fine, restitution, community service 
Correct policies and 
practices, relief for 
individuals 
Govt's right to appeal Very limited Yes 
Source: Criminal Section (US DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2002). 
 
In conclusion, the nature and the results of criminal prosecutions have led 
prosecutors to find supplemental mechanisms to control police misconduct. Despite the 
fact that the success of civil litigation in the country as a whole has not been proven, the 
trend is to use civil litigation more frequently and keep criminal prosecution as an option. 
At least, John Dunne is favoring civil litigation over criminal prosecution while Isabelle 
Katz Pinzler advises the use of both remedies equally where appropriate. Dunne’s 
rationalization is not to spend resources on both fronts, but to use them effectively. 
Dunne thinks that more precisely addressing the managers may target the source of police 
misconduct. Civil litigation is the tool that gives opportunity to make the managers 
correct their departments (Agathocleous, 1998). 
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The Exclusionary Rule 
The Supreme Court has decided a lot of cases of police misconduct that majority 
of them were addressing the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures of the citizens and their personal effects. As a result of such 
decisions, the high court articulated exclusionary rule as a standard to exclude any 
evidence against suspects in court, if this evidence is obtained through illegal means. In 
1914, the landmark case of Weeks v. United States was decided and police officers began 
to observe high standards for conducting searches and seizures. For many law 
enforcement officers, 1963 decision of Mapp v. Ohio was accusation of effective law 
enforcement while it was a decision to minimize unconstitutional infringement of law 
enforcement on human rights of the citizens. The Court expanded these guarantees to 
Miranda warnings to make the suspects aware of their constitutional rights in Miranda v. 
Arizona decision in 1966. Years after this decision, in United States v. Dickerson, the 
Court readdressed the importance of Miranda warnings (Champion, 2001). 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects all US citizens from unlawful 
searches and seizures. It states: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularity describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.” 
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Other privacy rights are judicially derived from this amendment. Stop and frisk 
guidelines, probable cause requirements, and general exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are included in these privacy rights. All of these rights are enforced through 
the use of exclusionary rule, as a remedy against police misconduct (King, 2002). 
The exclusionary rule is the mechanism that ensures evidence presented in a court 
of law will not be obtained in a way that violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
person to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule is a 
judicially created remedy that, in essence, states that any and all evidence obtained as a 
result of illegal searches, seizures, and confessions is inadmissible at trial, at least for the 
purpose of providing direct proof of the suspect’s guilt (McWhirter, 1994; Emanuel, 
1997). 
The Fourth Amendment guarantee is intended to prevent police from violating the 
rights of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures…” However, the words of the Fourth Amendment do 
not specify how to enforce these rights. In spite of the guarantee that the Fourth 
Amendment provides, violations are a daily practice. The Supreme Court, then, created 
the exclusionary rule so that the prosecutors would essentially be unable to convict their 
suspects based on illegally obtained evidence (Emanuel, 2002; Fletcher, 1998). 
Historical Evolution of the Exclusionary Rule 
Until Weeks v. United States in 1914, the Fourth Amendment was essentially 
unenforceable. A full 123 years after the Bill of Rights was ratified, there was no 
federally mandated mechanism that deterred police from violating the Fourth 
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Amendment rights of suspects. As Justice Potter Stewart stated, the exclusionary rule was 
like roller coaster that was constructed imperfectly while it was speeding on its way 
(Steward, 1983). 
Table 4 (see page 69) shows the important landmark cases regarding the 
exclusionary rule.  In the case of Boyd v. United States (1886:616), the US Supreme 
Court first ordered the exclusion of evidence. Interestingly, Boyd was not a criminal trial. 
It was an asset forfeiture proceeding against two businessmen who had violated federal 
import and customs revenue laws. The appeal Boyd’s lawyers raised did not challenge 
the search and seizure procedures used by the government. Rather, they challenged, on 
the grounds of the Fifth Amendment, whether a man’s papers, which he was compelled to 
produce, could be used against him. The Court held that the compulsory production of 
papers constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, and that the act of the United 
States Marshall violated Boyd’s the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The court held 
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are intimately related. In essence, the US 
Marshall’s actions compelled Boyd to witness against himself, a Fifth Amendment 
violation. The 1874 Customs Revenue Act, which mandated the compulsory production 
of papers, violated the Constitution by requiring an unreasonable search and seizure 
conflicted directly with the Fourth Amendment (Schlesinger, 1977; Landynski, 1966). 
In Weeks v. United States (1914:383) the court’s decision revolved solely around 
the Fourth Amendment. Police conducted a warrantless search Week’s home and seized 
letters, subsequently turning these letters over to a US Marshall. The Supreme Court held 
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that the letters were seized unlawfully and should have been returned to the owner upon 
demand. Using these letters as evidence against Weeks constituted prejudicial error. 
The Supreme Court reasserted the application of the exclusionary rule in federal cases 
(Schlesinger, 1977). However, the Court also outlined the “silver platter doctrine” which 
stated that evidence obtained by state and local agents could be used in federal cases 
regardless of whether the search and seizure procedures conformed to the limitations of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, the Court stated, only restricted the 
Table 4. Landmark Cases 
Date                        Case                          Decision of the Supreme Court 
1886 Boyd v, 
United States 
First occasion on which Court ordered illegally seized evidence excluded 
   
1914 Weeks v. 
United States 
Reasserted the exclusionary rule for federal courts 
   
1949 Wolf v, 
Colorado 
Refused to impose the exclusionary rule on states 
   
1961 Mapp v. 
Ohio 
Imposed the exclusionary rule on states 
   
1963 Wong Sun 
v. United States 
Extended the exclusionary rule to include the "fruits" of an illegal search 
   
1965 Linkletter 
v. United States 
Refused to apply Mapp retroactively to cases decided before 1961 
   
1974 United 
States v. Calandra 
Refused to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury questions based on 
illegally seized evidence 
   
1976 Wolff v. 
Rice                 
and                  
Stone v. Powell 
Limited the relief available in federal courts for state prisoners who claim 
search and seizure violations in their state trials 
Source: Schlesinger (1977). 
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activities of federal officers, not state officers (Inciardi, 1999). The Court rejected to 
apply silver platter doctrine in Elkins v. United States (1960:206; Schlesinger, 1977), and 
totally overruled the doctrine in Mapp v. Ohio by ordering that the exclusionary rule is 
required in state level also (Whitebread & Slobogin, 2000). 
In Wolf v. Colorado (1949:25), the Supreme Court ruled that through the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal guarantees apply to state entities. 
However, the Court declined to specifically comment on how the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied to the exclusionary rule. Thus, states were not obliged to exclude evidence that 
was obtained unconstitutionally. Three years after the Wolf decision, the Court held in 
Rochin v. California (1952:165) that if the methods used to obtain evidence were so 
objectionable that they “shock the conscience,” then the evidence should be excluded 
from trial in state courts. In this case, Justice Frankfurter reversed his holding in Wolf, 
insisting that the notion of due process compels states to not obtain evidence by means 
that offend “a sense of justice.” Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule was not specifically 
applied to states, unless the methods that were used to obtain evidence were so heinous as 
to “shock the conscience” of the defendant. With only this very vague and subjective 
standard to go by, the exclusion of evidence rule in the states was far from decided 
(Schlesinger, 1977; McWhirter, 1994; Polyviou, 1982). 
Finally in 1961, the Supreme Court set a firm standard for the exclusionary rule. 
In Mapp v. Ohio (1961:643) the Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states 
effectively expanding upon their decision in Wolf to address the exclusionary rule. The 
Court chose to sustain Wolf partially reasserting that the Fourth Amendment right to 
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privacy was extended to states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
(Schlesinger, 1977; McWhirter, 1994). The Mapp decision of the Court brought the state 
and federal government together applying the same rules of search and seizure and, 
exclusion to both levels of jurisdiction (Polyviou, 1982; Inciardi, 1999). 
In Wong Sun v. United States (1963:471), the Court extended the so-called “fruits 
of the poisonous tree” doctrine to verbal evidence gathered as a result of an illegal search. 
The first formulation of the “tainted fruit” doctrine came in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States (1920:385). In this case the Court held that evidence obtained as a result of 
a bad search and seizure, like a void, warrant would be inadmissible in trial. Moreover, 
any ancillary evidence that is discovered as a result of the initial illegality in obtaining 
evidence would make it inadmissible, based on the notion that government should not 
benefit from the violation of Constitutionally protected rights of citizens. The tainted fruit 
theory likens evidence that has been obtained illegally from a tree that has been poisoned. 
If this illegal evidence leads authorities to additional evidence, as offspring of the 
poisonous tree, it would considered to be tainted fruit. 
However, the Court pointed out an exception to exclusionary rule both in Nardone 
v. United States (1939:338) and “Silverthorne: the independent source doctrine.” The 
government can establish that the evidence obtained came not from illegal activity, but 
from a source independent of this illegal activity, then the evidence would be admissible. 
This independent source doctrine led the Court later in Nix v. Williams (1984:431) to 
formulate the inevitable discovery doctrine, as another exception to exclusionary rule. If 
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the police would have discovered the “tainted fruit” anyway through the course of their 
other activities, the fruit is admissible. 
In Wong Sun v. United States, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to both 
direct and indirect fruits of illegal governmental conduct (Schlesinger, 1977). However, 
again an exception to exclusionary rule, “attenuated or dissipated taint” was reframed 
inspired from the attenuation idea of Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States (1939:338), 
that a test should be done whether the derivative evidence was a product of initial 
illegality or it was distinguishable from initial illegality with a factor attenuated the 
connection. If such a connection has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, then, 
the evidence would have become admissible (Inciardi, 1999; Schlesinger, 1977; Norton, 
1998; Whitebread & Slobogin, 2000). 
 In United States v. Calandra (1974:338), the Court refused to extend the 
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. The Court cited Linkletter v.Walker 
(1965:618), which stated that the purpose of the rule was to deter police misconduct 
rather than to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim. The Court also 
asserted that the traditional role of the grand jury would be compromised if the 
exclusionary rule applied to grand jury proceedings. The role of the grand jury was 
simply to assess the strength of the prosecution’s case. It would be up to the trial judge to 
rule on the admissibility of evidence. In Linkletter v. United States, the court refused to 
retroactively apply the exclusionary rule to criminal cases decided in state courts before 
1961 (Schlesinger, 1977). By refusing to apply Mapp retroactivity, the Court essentially 
asserted once again that the exclusionary rule functions first and foremost to deter police 
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from conducting illegal search and seizures. The Linkletter Court ruled that the costs of 
retroactively applying Mapp outweighed the benefits. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
violations against past defendants were outweighed by the cost of letting potentially 
guilty men free (Kamisar, 1982-1983). Thus “Calandra sends the wrong message to who 
are conducting searches and seizures of people unlikely to be indicted, but who are 
somehow relevant an investigation and may be questioned at a grand jury proceeding” 
(Whitebread & Slobogin, 2000, p. 23). 
The “good faith” exception was decided in a pair of cases, the United States v. 
Leon (1984:897) and Massachusetts v. Shepard (1984:981) cases. In Leon, the Court held 
that police acting in good faith on a warrant that was subsequently found unsupported by 
probable cause would not result in the exclusion of the evidence if “neutral and detached” 
magistrate issues the warrant, even though the magistrate erred. In Shepard, the court 
held that the warrant issued on an improper form is not excusable and police actions take 
in good faith will not result in an exception to the exclusionary rule. 
The Court has applied the exclusionary rule sometimes as it constitutionally 
mandated, as with Mapp, and sometimes as a judicial remedy to clarify complicated 
situations, as with Leon. The Court has never reached an end to this issue. The current 
trend, however, is to emphasize the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police 
misconduct as a judicially created remedy. As Kamisar (1982-1983) noted, the United 
States v. Wallace & Tiernan Company (1949:796) was the first case their initial ruling in 
this case, the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily command the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court took a position to accept the 
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exclusionary rule primarily as a deterrence mechanism, if not solely. The Court adopted 
the position that the exclusionary rule was a remedial device rather than a right. However, 
not only the Court changes its ruling over the course of time about the legitimacy of the 
exclusionary rule, but even particular Justices reversed their decisions. For example, in 
Wolf v. Colorado, Justice Black declared the exclusionary rule to be a judicially created 
rule of evidence, which Congress might negate, but not a command of the Fourth 
Amendment. In Mapp and again in Linkletter, he described exclusion as constitutionally 
required by the privilege against self-incrimination. He changed his mind in Kaufman v. 
United States (1969:238) and turned to the view that the “one primary and overriding 
purpose” of the exclusionary rule was “the deterrence of unconstitutional searches and 
seizures by the police" (Dripps, 2001). 
The rules of exclusion have evolved through the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment by the Supreme Court. As Dripps pointed out, the Court one time asserted 
that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally mandated [Mapp v. Ohio (1961); Dripps, 
2001]. 
In conclusion, the exclusionary rule issue is not yet settled in the minds of the 
Supreme Court. It seems that the future of the exclusionary remedy will be more 
controversial, and will consist of more exceptions. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Exclusionary Rule 
Wahlbeck indicates that the law is very dynamic and is applied to new situations 
in accordance with the needs of the society. While the Court applies rules, it is bound also 
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by legal constraints. Legal change in decisions regarding search and seizure are more 
dynamic and more influenced than other legal issues (Wahlbeck, 1997). 
It is natural that there are differences in the application of the exclusionary rule 
between states and federal courts.  The history of the exclusionary rule shows that the 
issue is far from settled in any of these (Kafka, 2001). Supreme Court decisions regarding 
search and seizure are more dynamic and subject to change than any other area of the law 
(Wahlbeck, 1997). 
The most important and strongest criticism of the exclusionary rule is that it 
enables criminals to go free (Hirschel, 1979). In People v. Defore (1926:12), Justice 
Clark, using Justice Cardozo’s words before him, states that the criminal has to go free 
because the constable has blundered (Segal, 1984). 
Despite the massive debate over the exclusionary rule, the exclusionary rule has 
had a historical duty to accomplish: to set the standards and educate both the public and 
the government about civil rights. Nevertheless, some scholars are very pessimistic about 
the exclusionary rule, stating that the exclusionary rule is a sinking liner in the ocean, 
while scholars are trying to rearrange deck chairs (Amar, 1994). Others, however, state 
that the rules set forth by the Warren Court have been digested very well, and most police 
organizations have reorganized to comply with these new ways of “doing business” 
(Swanson et al., 2001). 
Dripps lists his ideas on the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule, ideas that 
are parallel to the ides of Swanson et al.: 
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(1) all modern studies find that the rate of successful suppression motions 
is quite low; 
(2) warrant use skyrocketed after Mapp; 
(3) Police departments instituted or greatly expanded training programs in 
Fourth Amendment law in response to the exclusionary rule; 
(4) Deliberate efforts by police to avoid exclusion--by compliance with 
specific court decisions, by pretext arrests, by third party searches to 
exploit the standing  exception, and even by police perjury--show that 
the police shape their behavior in response to the risk of suppression; 
(5) Police and prosecutors say that they are influenced by the risk of 
suppression; 
(6) The faith of critics of the rule in the ability to deter criminals is 
inconsistent with skepticism about deterring the police (Dripps, 2001, 
p. 14). 
On the other hand, critics of the exclusionary rule have powerful objections. 
Dripps lists these as well: 
(1) that the rule has the undesirable effect of releasing clearly guilty 
offenders; 
(2) that the rule does nothing for innocent victims of police excess; 
(3) that the rule's deterrent benefits are, as a factual matter, questionable; 
(4) that, if the rule does deter, it over-deters by causing the police to 
refrain from borderline but lawful searches; 
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(5) that alternative remedies might be made much more effective by such 
arrangements as liquidated or punitive damages, excluding character 
evidence about unsavory plaintiffs; and 
(6) that exclusion fosters police perjury, trial court tolerance of police 
perjury, and appellate court hostility toward substantive Fourth 
Amendment rights (Dripps, 2001, p. 12). 
Jones sees the Calandra decision as a weakening of the exclusionary rule. 
Calandra assured the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule by excluding it from 
grand jury proceedings. In opposition to that, the Texas Legislature allows for the judge 
to instruct the jury if a deficiency exists in evidence. The Supreme Court’s reasoning was 
not to interfere with the historical duty of the grand jury (Jones, 1997). 
Both defenders and critics of the exclusionary rule admit to the weak aspects of 
their ideas. Defenders admit that even if it is justifiable, it is disturbing that the rule lets 
criminals go free. On the other hand, critics admit remedies other than the exclusionary 
rule are ineffective (Dripps, 2001). Thus the debate will never end, but will continue with 
new exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 
Civilian Review Boards 
Due to the perception that most city, state, and even federal police agencies are 
ineffective at preventing police misconduct, independent civilian review boards are 
increasingly utilized in many communities. Previous reform efforts to establish review 
boards were the result of high tension between minorities and the police. Today, 
however, civilian review boards are also created due to the belief that IAD’s are not 
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effective. Civilian oversight is seen as most effective tool citizens can use to distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable police conduct in democratic societies. As David 
Harris stated “accountability is uniquely an American idea…The Declaration of 
Independence should be seen as a proclamation that accountability will stand in this 
country and nobody will stand for government without it” (US Commission on Civil 
Rights, 2000, pp. 7, 8 of 20 of Ch. 4). 
According to Kappeler and his coauthors, the need for civilian review boards 
arose due to extreme secrecy regarding the files of the internal affairs divisions. Police 
administrations were not allowing the public access to information about police 
misconduct. Civilian review boards aim to correct this problem by including people other 
than police personnel in the disciplining process (Kappeler et al., 1998). 
When the police fail to hold themselves accountable, they lose the public’s 
confidence. This is especially true when the actions of errant officers are poorly handled. 
The discipline boards of police departments are the main bodies responsible for handling 
police misconduct, and they are largely made up of sworn police officers. Criticisms of 
these discipline boards object to “the length of time taken to resolve a complaint, the 
extent to which the complainants are kept informed about their case and the perceived 
independence of investigation.” Before changes can be made in police disciplining 
boards, most disputes were reportedly resolved by way of an Informal Resolution (IR). 
An IR is only applicable when the complainant agrees, in theory. However, in practice, 
IR’s are used to resolve one third of all complaints, and most of the time against the 
complainant’s will. This system was actively protecting the actions of rogue officers. 
 79
A survey of British citizens, conducted in 1997, has revealed that citizens favor a 
disciplinary board that is independent of the police administration. The survey also 
reveals that citizens are concerned that police-run disciplinary boards are likely to 
respond only to the complaints of the rich and powerful. The complaints of the poor, it 
was feared, would be cast aside (Waters, 2000). 
Through its research Amnesty International has found out that not only are very 
few officers disciplined, but the sanctions imposed on them tend to be very minor when 
uniformed police personnel are in charge of discipline. Based on this research, some 
departments have tried to rectify the situation by incorporating civilians into their 
disciplinary review boards (Amnesty International, 1996). However, these civilian review 
boards were no more successful than their predecessors. Most of these boards were not as 
efficient as police disciplinary boards. In fact, some of these civilian review boards 
caused individual police officers to lodge more complaints against the department than 
the citizens lodged against the department. Furthermore, these civilian review boards 
were found to be more lenient than the review boards manned by uniformed personnel 
(Kerstetter et al., 1996). 
Philips and Smith argue that while celebrity cases are over-represented in the CJ 
system, the most prevalent types of police violence are under-reported, namely those that 
occur in non-visible locations and times.  The researchers suggest that special concern 
should be applied to time-space variables when investigating non-lethal, but violent 
police encounters with citizens (Philips & Smith, 2000). 
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Changes made in discipline boards and disciplining policies made officers “think 
twice and play it safe.” Waters in his research suggests that complainants are very 
valuable to police administrators. They give administrators a sense of how they need to 
improve their service to the community. To facilitate this and other types of feedback 
from the community, Waters suggests that police administrators establish a twenty-four 
hour telephone line. They should also place comment cards in police stations (Waters, 
2000). Amnesty International, on the other hand, finds civilian review boards very 
valuable for providing public accountability in police misconduct investigations 
(Amnesty International, 1996). 
In its “Good Practice Guide,” the Citizens Charter Complaints Task Force 
outlines several of the qualities of an effective complaint system: 
(1) Should be easily accessible and publicized; 
(2) Should establish a simple process for complainants to follow; 
(3) Should be fair, fast and impartial; 
(4) Should keep people informed of the progress of their complaints; 
(5) Should assure confidentiality of both officers and complainants; 
(6) Should effectively address all aspects of the issue at hand; 
(7) Should redress the grievances appropriately; 
(8) Should help managers improve service (Waters, 2000).  
How police respond to complaints is sometimes just as important as the fact that 
they respond. It is not rare to discover that citizens find the police response to be too 
mechanical or “canned.” Goldsmith calls this a “forensic legalistic” approach, one that is 
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neither flexible nor tailored to the individual. A complaint handling system, the states, 
should be empathetic and responsive to the complainant (Goldsmith, 1991). 
According to Reiner, who handles a complaint is not as important as how it is 
handled. A complaint system that corrects the problem is much more desirable than a 
system that punishes the individual officer (Waters, 2000). 
The US Commission on Civil Rights advocates a structural classification system 
for civilian review boards. This classification system was created by Sean Hecker, who 
was inspired by the works of Samuel Walker and Vic E. Bumphus. Hecker proposes four 
levels or classes of civilian involvement in the review of police misconduct: 
• Class One. Review agencies have the greatest discretion. 
Nonsworn staff members perform tasks such as receiving complaints, 
preliminary fact-finding, reviewing investigative reports, and recommending 
disciplinary procedures. This is the most common type of civilian review 
among the fifty largest cities in the country. 
• Class Two. Class Two civilian review boards are less 
autonomous than Class One structures. Police officers are responsible for 
investigating civilian complaints. Civilians, or a committee that contains 
some percentage of civilians, review the police officers’ reports and then 
provide a recommended outcome to a law enforcement authority. This is the 
most common form around the country. 
• Class Three. Police department personnel investigate and 
review civilian complaints. The department’s internal affairs division then 
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advises a police department official of its recommended course of action for 
the complaint. Civilians may be included as members of an appellate board, 
which reviews appeals of the internal affairs division’s decisions. The 
appellate board can then provide alternate recommendations to the 
departmental official. 
• Class Four. Third-party auditors are responsible for analyzing 
police departments’ complaint review policies and providing suggested 
changes to these procedures (US Commission on Human Rights, 2000, p. 8 
of 20 of ch.4; Hecker, 1997). 
Civilian review boards would bring some advantages due to their independent 
nature and effectiveness. First of all, investigations would be handled more objectively 
and thoroughly As a result, more officers would face disciplinary action and the sustained 
complaints rate would be higher. Police misconduct would be deterred more effectively 
than it was based on the principals of general and specific deterrence. Civilian review 
boards would provide a higher level of satisfaction to both the officers and the public 
(Walker & Kreise,l 1997). Although none of these propositions have been proven either 
effective or ineffective through research, there is a general belief that civilian oversight 
will bring about desirable results. Namely, civilian oversight will make police 
misconduct visible to the public eye. It will be used as a tool to oversee the policies of the 
police, and will bring effective punishment enhancements to the system. In spite of its 
many criticisms from the police, civilian review is necessary to make police both 
democratic and effective. Another advantage of civilian review boards is that they give 
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police organizations the appearance of impartiality, thereby decreasing public criticism 
(Kappeler et al., 1998). 
A recent survey administered to police officers has revealed that police officers do 
not agree with one another about the effectiveness of civilian review boards. About 41 % 
of the officers surveyed believed that civilian review boards are beneficial. Another 42 % 
stated that civilian review boards were not a good thing. The remaining officers had no 
opinion or remained neutral about the effectiveness of civilian review boards. It is worth 
noting that police had a substantially higher opinion of IAD’s. More than two-thirds of 
the officers surveyed supported the use of IAD’s (Hunter, 1999, p. 164). 
The practice of civilian oversight is criticized by many police officers. John 
Ellement writes in his editorial “Roache Creates Appeals Board” in The Boston Global 
that creating any kind of civilian board raises arguments, especially if certain civil rights 
groups and community organizations support such boards.  According to Ellement, 
Donald L. Murray, the head of Boston Patrolmen’s Association, felt himself nearly raped 
and sodomized after the creation of a community appeals board (Iris 1998, p. 3 of 18). 
The article asserts that police need secrecy. One cannot understand the consequences of 
policing without being involved with it. Civilian oversight is a reformist idea, one that 
diminishes police activity by advising soft crime fighting techniques (Ellement, 1992). 
On the other hand, several researchers point out that many civilian boards act as an 
advisory board rather than a disciplinary board. They are very weak and are scarce in 
resources and in personnel. Most importantly, civilian oversight boards have no means to 
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change police practices. They have neither subpoena nor disciplinary powers (Kappeler et 
al., 1998; US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000). 
Civilian groups have often criticized IAD’s for not pursuing police misconduct 
vigorously enough. This belief led civilians, especially minority groups, to create civilian 
review boards (Abadinsky & Winfree, 1992, p. 294). For some, civilian review boards 
are the only effective way to control police misconduct. Furthermore, the federal 
government should cut funding to police departments who do not have effective 
accountability systems (Nation, 1999). However, there are some who believe that police 
are inherently brutal and that civilian review boards are therefore powerless. They serve 
to cover-up police brutality rather than discipline. These boards have no subpoena power. 
Their personnel are supposed to be civilians; however, more often than not, they are 
retired police officers (Boettcher, 2001). 
Conclusion to Control Mechanisms 
As a conclusion, Section 1983 and especially Monell claims may serve as a 
deterrent to police misconduct, encouraging police departments to improve their policies 
and educate the public about police misconduct. Monell claims fill the space that lack of 
prosecution left (Taylor, 1999). Without federal influence, police would not achieve 
much in the way of reforms. Section 1983 is a tool that forces departments to make a 
systemic change in their agencies (Barrineau, 1994; Gilles, 2000). Holding local 
governments responsible for their involvement in enforcing unconstitutional laws is a 
step in the right direction (Brown, 1999). Civil liability has become a major concern for 
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law enforcement officials and local governments. Civil liability is the primary resource 
the courts can use to control police conduct (Vaughn et al., 2001). 
Regular training and certification programs are the best defense against civil 
liability litigation (Vaughn & Coomes, 1995). Civil litigation is more successful than 
criminal prosecutions because in criminal cases, the evidence must be beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence is enough (Amnesty 
International, 1996). Section 1983 lawsuits alert managers to control their organizations 
and to correct unreasonable behaviors (Kappeler et al., 1998). However, some scholars 
point out that pursuing a Section 1983 lawsuit is not so simple due to the high standard of 
proof (Kean, 1999). 
The exclusionary rule has done its job to improve policing standards in the US. 
However, the debate still goes on regarding its ability to deter police misconduct. This 
debate will probably not end anytime in the near future. The most important criticism 
against the exclusionary rule is that it lets criminals go free. 
Civilian review boards came into light as a promising mechanism to control 
police misconduct from outside the agency. However, they have generally been shown to 
be inefficient and unable to reach their goal in time. Now, most police chiefs consider 
civilian review boards to bee tools to show their accountability to the public. Most of 
these boards are made up of retired police officers or persons otherwise extremely 
sympathetic to the police. 
USC. 42, Section 14141 is another remedy that is relatively new in controlling 
police misconduct. It has been in use since 1994, and is considered by many to hold 
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promise as a way to successfully reform police agencies.  However, it is unclear how well 
Section 14141 actually reform police agencies. Only time will tell. Further research is 
needed to reach a conclusion. Since measures like Section 14141 are being offered as a 
























A MODEL FOR THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE 
As was discussed under the “Criminal Prosecution” section of this thesis, the 
ineffectiveness of criminal prosecution led the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights 
Division to find a new and more effective tool to sue police departments. The first 
attempt by the DOJ to sue an entire police department and key city officials including the 
mayor, the medical examiner, police commissioner, and fifteen other police 
administrators came to light in United States v. City of Philadelphia (1980;187) in August 
1979. In this case, it was alleged that police officials systematically violated the civil 
rights of the citizenry. Furthermore, departmental policies and practices deliberately 
encouraged such abuses. The evidence showed repeated examples of police misconduct 
performed as a matter of routine. Despite the fact that the DOJ was not successful in that 
case, it became a model for USC 42, Section 14141 which was passed in 1994. Congress 
granted power to the DOJ’s Attorney General to actively protect the civil rights of the 
public when the patterns and practices of governmental agencies, including local police, 
went beyond the bounds of the Constitution (Agathocleous, 1998). 
This new ability to prosecute the pattern or practice of governmental bodies by 
targeting their policies, training, disciplining, and complaint handling procedures became 
a effective tool for reforming police agencies.  Despite the fact that this tool was used 
only on a limited number of police departments, the initiatives became important 
mechanisms for improving policing standards. More importantly, they allowed the 
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federal government the opportunity to define what was acceptable, giving other police 
departments the chance to improve their standards without being subjected to a lawsuit 
(Agathocleous, 1998; Livingston, 1999). 
What happens, if a police department’s practices or policies are illegal or 
improper? What happens if the department has not established a fair and effective system 
for investigating complaints that have been filed against the department or its employees?  
Before USC. 42, Section 14141, according to provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
police departments had to articulate their policies concerning the protection of the 
constitutional rights of citizens. They had to formally take steps to prevent patterns of 
unconstitutional behavior. Police administrators, then, held some culpability for the 
actions of their officers. They had to formally put in writing what behavior was 
unacceptable, outline how the department would handle such behavior, and follow 
through. The aim of this procedure was the result of an idea that the best way to correct 
the constitutionally errant policies of an organization was to make it the duty of the 
respective police departments to correct these policies. The pressure on the individual 
organization becomes very constant. The organizational administrators determine what is 
right and wrong beforehand so that when an incident occurs, they will know how to 
respond. Problems are remedied internally, and the judiciary does not have to get 
involved (Goldstein, 1977). 
The Crime Control Act, which was promulgated by Congress in 1994, has 
brought very effective changes related to this issue. The FBI, on its website, posts 
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information that is of interest to the public, including this information about the Crime 
Control Act of 1994: 
“Title 42, USC., Section 14141, Pattern and Practice 
This civil statute was a provision within the Crime Control Act of 
1994 and makes it unlawful for any governmental authority, or agent 
thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to 
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or 
by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility 
for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles 
that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe 
that a violation has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of 
the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and 
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice. 
Types of misconduct covered include, among other things: 
1. Excessive Force  
2. Discriminatory Harassment 
3. False Arrest 
4. Coercive Sexual Conduct  
5. Unlawful Stops, Searches, or Arrests” (FBI, 2000). 
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Declaratory relief is a statement of the judge that outlines the legal 
standards that govern the police departments that are subject to lawsuit. Equitable 
relief is a court order stating that the department has to abide by the rules that are 
mentioned by declaratory relief (Agathocleous, 1998). 
Section 14141 imposes vicarious liability on governmental bodies for the acts of 
their law enforcement officers. The premier responsibility of all law enforcement 
agencies is to eliminate their officers’ unlawful conduct. Section 14141 creates a 
mechanism for enforcement for the US Attorney General. When he or she develops 
reasonable cause to believe that police agencies fail to prevent a pattern or practice of 
unlawful conduct, he or she has the authority and the responsibility to take action. Section 
14141 provides a “cause of action” where agencies that violate the constitutional rights of 
citizens as a result of the pattern or practice of unlawful conduct can be punished. A 
cause of action suit can be filed because the agency has failed to prevent the unlawful 
acts (DOJ, 1999). 
As it is written in USC. 42 Section 14141, a “consent decree” is an agreement 
between a police department and the Department of Justice to establish a set of guidelines 
that promote a better management, training, supervision, discipline, and complaint 
procedures. A consent decree can be established after demonstrating that the defendant 
under US Code 42, Section 14141, namely a municipality, police department or some 
other party, has engaged in “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement 
officers…that deprives persons of rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the US” The term “pattern or practice” denotes something 
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more than a one time occurrence or isolated incident. It refers to a pattern of behavior, a 
common practice, the violation of the rights of individuals as a matter of “standard 
operating procedure” within a police department (Livingston, 1999, p. 5 of 37). 
To sign a consent decree, there are several steps to be completed in advance. After 
the investigation is made by the FBI, the main investigative body of the Department of 
Justice, if the US Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has 
occurred, he or she may obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate 
the pattern or practice, for or in the name of the United States (FBI, 2000). 
 Consent decrees have three principal areas, police training, proper receipt and 
investigation of referrals and complaints, early warning system. The first two principal 
areas are very clear. The aim of the early warning system is to identify police officers that 
are repeatedly involved in citizen complaints or other problematic behavior (Livingston, 
1999). However, these principal areas are subject to change from case to case due to the 
different policies, patterns, or practices of police departments. 
One purpose of the consent decree is to ensure that all personnel in law 
enforcement agencies receive a clear and through education before being assigned to the 
job and that they go through in-service training.  The aim of education is to instruct 
police personnel about non-discrimination, the use of force and proper ways to interact 
with citizens. Also, supervisors are given the duty to supervise in accordance with the 
aims of education to support personnel in the field (DOJ, 1999). 
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 requires that the 
US Attorney General collect data about the excessive use of force of law enforcement 
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officers for research or statistical purposes. Moreover, the act allows the federal 
government to aggressively seek out and eliminate a pattern or practice of abuses by law 
enforcement officials in any jurisdiction, including state jurisdictions (Amnesty 
International, 1996, p. 42 of 51)  
The USA Today reported that consent decrees are promising success for future 
reforms: 
“The city must also provide more officers for the department’s Internal 
Affairs Group to investigate serious uses of police force. Within two years, the 
department must also set up a sophisticated computer system to track performance 
of police officers, in order to more quickly identify problems. “Between 1974 and 
1997, tiny Steubenville, Ohio, with barely 50 officers, averaged more than two 
police-brutality lawsuits a year. The situation was so bad at that point, after 
paying $850,000 in court judgments and settlements; the city actually lost its 
police liability insurance. 
In Pittsburgh throughout the 1990s, members of the Bureau of Police 
became notorious for finding disrespectful citizens guilty of “contempt of cop” 
and throwing them in the cooler overnight on trumped-up charges. 
The good news for beleaguered citizens in both cities, and elsewhere, is 
that a relatively new reform tool —consent decrees signed with the Justice 
Department in the face of federal civil rights litigation– is achieving notable 
success. 
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Steubenville signed one such decree in 1997 and hasn’t had a single 
brutality case filed against it since. Pittsburgh also signed one in 1997 and since 
then, the city with a reputation for never disciplining a bad cop has found the 
means to discharge 12” (USA Today, 10/11/2000). 
It is still too early to make an assessment about the US Code 42, Section 14141. 
Its future impact will depend very much how it is enforced, but there are three key points 
that should be remembered: 
1- It is certain that the limited number of consent decrees signed between 
various police departments and the Department of Justice will open a new 
era to lessen the brutal practices of police officers. 
2- Consent decrees require that police departments use enhanced training, the 
proper investigation of complaints regarding police misconduct, and an early 
warning system. 
3- Consent decrees support the exclusionary rule, which does not adequately 
ensure that police managers control the conduct of their officers as they 
investigate and collect evidence (Livingston, 1999). 
Consent decrees are aiming to put new managerial tools into the hands of local 
officials. This new management technique has to ensure proper training, the proper 
handling of cases and complaints and a proactive approach towards problematic police 
officers via an early warning system. Consent decrees include different provisions. This 
is to account for the reality that every law enforcement agency differs in its 
responsibility, size, structure, and the community it serves. A law enforcement agency 
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can avoid a pattern or practice investigation and subsequent lawsuit only if its policies are 
designed, implemented and enforced. The agency must accept accountability for 
misconduct incidents and other violations of constitutional rights if it fails to implement 
effective training and disciplining (Livingston, 1999). 
Gilbert G. Gallegos, National President of the Fraternal Order of Police, opposes 
Section 14141. He asserts that the problem is not individual police officers, but the 
management of police departments.  The policies regarding training, recruitment and 
enforcement are set by the administrators. The Department of Justice expects the 
ineffective administrators to implement the decrees, but these administrators themselves 
are the root of the problem. It should be accepted that law enforcement in the US is local, 
not federal. Thus, the problems regarding law enforcement should be resolved in local 
level (Gallegos, 2000). 
Gallegos, however, forgets the initial procedure of forcing the police department 
to sign a consent decree. The illegal pattern or practice of the police department should be 
evidenced by the complaints which are investigated by the Civil Rights Division of the 
DOJ. Moreover, the US Attorney General has no obligation to search for “reasonable 
cause.” Actually, a consent decree is a modest way to improve a brutal and/or corrupt 
police department by giving them time and chance to accomplish their goals. If the 
administration takes care of the problems that arise from illegal conduct, then the DOJ is 
no longer concerned with the department. Section 14141 was passed in the first place due 
to the inability of local and state police to control their own officers (Agathocleous, 
1998). 
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Jacobi confronts Section 14141 on two fronts. First, Section 14141 applies only to 
a “pattern or practice” which is very hard to prove. Second, only the Attorney General, 
not private parties, may invoke it. When prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute police 
misconduct and add to their enormous workload, it becomes an ineffective tool for 
controlling police misconduct. However, 42 USC. 14141 promises to serve the very 
worthy goal of correcting police departments with extreme systemic problems. But it is 
simply not designed to reach individual cases of extreme police misconduct (Jacobi, 
2000). 
In light of the concerns mentioned above, it should be decided how to formulate 
Section 14141 to suit the Turkish National Police. First of all, the Turkish National Police 
is not a local organization, but a national organization. It serves a whole nation of people. 
It is a centralized organization, and citizen oversight of police practices is very limited. 
However, political patronage and political control over the police is very effective. As 
Mutlu reports, “appointments, promotions, and the honor system are mostly regulated by 
personal networks, rather than legal rules, at the expense of the democratic 
institutionalization of policing. Those networks are mostly based on political affiliation.” 
Nepotism and favoritism goes against legality and disturbs the morality of society. As a 
result, the essential law enforcement duties of the Turkish National Police become 
confused (Mutlu, 2000, p. 388). Whit these considerations in mind, a mechanism to 
control the Turkish National Police that parallels Section 14141 should be handled by a 
committee that is immune from political influence. The State Supervisory Council is 
suitable for this task. However, it will be fruitful to add members to the committee from 
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universities and from the Turkish National Police. These would be scholarly and 
professional experts who could help investigate police misconduct cases and suggest 
reforms. The State Supervisory Council’s structure is explained in the 1982 Constitution 
of the Republic of Turkey, which reads as follows: 
“State Supervisory Council 
ARTICLE 108. The State Supervisory Council which shall be attached to 
the Office of the Presidency of the Republic with the purpose of performing and 
furthering the regular and efficient functioning of the administration and its 
observance of law, will be empowered to conduct upon the request of the 
President of the Republic all inquiries, investigations and inspections of all public 
bodies and organizations, all enterprises in which those public bodies and 
organizations share more than half of the capital, public professional 
organizations, employers' associations and labor unions at all levels, and public 
benefit associations and foundations. 
The Armed Forces and all judicial organs are outside the jurisdiction of 
the State Supervisory Council. 
The Members and the Chairman to be designated from among the 
members of the State Supervisory Council shall be appointed by the President of 
the Republic from among those with the qualifications set forth in the law. 
The functioning of the State Supervisory Council, the term of office of its 
members, and other matters relating to their status shall be regulated by law” 
(Constitution of the Republic of Turkey:Article 108). 
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The State Supervisory Council is not attached to any political party or body. The 
President is detached from all parties and above them; so is the Council. The Council 
may perform this important task with some additional members who are specialized in 
policing and human rights. This body may suggest and enforce International policing 
standards from a civil rights perspective. The Counsel should have the power to bring 
lawsuits against any entity or organization that does not live up to contemporary 
standards of public service. 
The Turkish National Police is a centralized organization. Its policies are made at 
the Headquarters of the Directorate General. The State Supervisory Council should 
investigate allegations both at the city level and in general. The general policies should be 
evaluated to determine whether they violate the constitutional rights and contemporary 
human rights standards. As it was done in the consent decrees signed by the police 
departments of Steubenville, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the Counsel should 
jointly enter into consent decrees with the individual police departments to improve their 
standards. However, training falls exclusively under the responsibility of the Directorate 
General of the Turkish National Police and Police Academy. The Council should advise 
these bodies to improve their training standards according to the human rights standards 
of the contemporary world. 
An independent monitor should monitor, review and analyze the implementation 
of the decree and improvements. A certain amount of time should be given to the 
organization to improve its standards. After the deadline, the Council should decide 
whether to sue the organization or certify that the organization met the required 
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standards. The Turkish judicial system and structure is different than US judicial system. 
Cases that concern the executive branch are tried in administrative courts. The cases 
handled in these courts have a uniquely administrative aspect and do not concern any 
criminal violations mentioned in other penal codes. Consequently, for the court to 
oversee consent decrees, these matters should be handled in administrative courts. One 
advantage of these courts is that some of their members are selected from the executive 
branch. They know how the system works, and how to repair its flaws. 
There is not much to say about how to apply Section 14141. It is totally a new 
concept for the Turkish National Police. There will be a vast amount of opposition to 
apply a remedy parallel to Section 14141. However, as was the case with civilian review 
boards in the US, a time will come that the administrators themselves will seek outside 
interference as a kind certification of compliance with contemporary standards. As 
Gottlieb, Levy, McAllister, Peck, & Yenisey assert, Turkey has a very unique position, 
being somewhat in-between civilizations. While Turkey is seeking to be a part of the 
Western world by integrating with the European Union, she still carries her traditional 
Turkish culture with her own positive and negative aspects. They say “An essential 
prerequisite to further integration into Europe, however, is the development of the 
Turkish legal system and institutions” (Gottliebb et al., 1997). 
It is well known that the criticisms about Turkey from its European counterparts 
are related to human rights issues and subsequently to the Turkish National Police. A 
version of Section 14141 will help the Turkish National Police to improve its standards 
and will be an example to other institutions, as well. 
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Control mechanisms other than Section 14141 currently exist in Turkey and are 
applied to the Turkish National Police. The Turkish National Police was established in 
1845 and has very deep roots that go well back into Turkish history. Its customs and 
policies change with the times. However, it is well known that there is more resistance to 
change in matured organizations than in new structures. Section 14141 will be a first step 
towards a sense of public accountability. The Council will be investigating the 
organization on many fronts. The investigation will include interviews with citizens. If 
this proposal is accepted, the public relations of the Turkish National Police will enter 
into a new era. 
Gunduz voices serious concerns about the relationship between the Turkish 
judicial system and the police. He lists three concerns. First, he is concerned about the 
lack of a judicial police. Prosecutors should rely on the police in their investigations, but 
the control of the police is maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. His second 
concern addresses the inadequate training of police in judicial matters. This may cause 
problems in investigations. His third concern was in regards to an Act that required the 
consent of superiors to prosecute law enforcement personnel. This Act is already 
abolished (Gunduz, 2001).  These concerns give a few hints of the new burdens that an 
oversight mechanism parallel to Section 14141 will bring to the administrators. 
Section 14141 is intended to improve policing standards, not to satisfy victims. 
The aim of this control mechanism is to satisfy the whole society, rather than to address 
an individual victim. The individual victim’s grievances are redressed by way of other 
means. It is not a secret that Section 14141 will set new burdens on the shoulders of the 
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administrators. First of all, political patronage will come to an end. Knowledge and 
training will be the basis for the selection of both administrators and rank and line 
officers. A fair system would benefit everyone in the Turkish National Police. To create a 
better future, administrators should carry the responsibility of reforming their own 
organizations. The reforms should be imposed from outside is not necessarily desired 
much. A statute similar to Section 14141 would be a good tool to reform the Turkish 
National Police. The system is not bad, people make it bad. The kind of remedial devices 
the Turkish National Police has is not as important as how it uses and applies these tools. 
The aim of this paper is not to say that the other controls are not effective. Actually, all 
remedies serve to oversee the organizations that societies authorize to use power. By 
keeping other remedies and adding them to Section 14141, there will be a new push to 
democratize the system and make the institutions accountable to both the judicial and 
executive branches. Section 14141 is a good tool to apply. 
As a last word, if this proposal is accepted and intended to be applied to the 
Turkish National Police, the best place to apply a similar remedy would be in 
metropolitan cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, because the examples given in this 
study are mostly taken from metropolitan cities of the United States. This will enable 
researchers in Turkey to adequately compare the results. When the number of personnel 
in these city police directorates is considered, the symptoms of police misconduct 
incidents will not be marginal. One will be able to find numerous cases to evaluate and 
new ways to repair flaws will be developed. Using these new methods, all other regions 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In 1979, Herman Goldstein in his seminal article, Improving Policing: A 
Problem-Oriented Approach, argued that reforms of internal police management would 
be unsuccessful unless police could effectively handle and address problems in a way the 
public expects them to be addressed (Goldstein, 1979). 
A survey administered to Texas police chiefs revealed that police chiefs list the 
better screening of applicants, better supervision, better training, early identification of 
problem officers, and treating people fairly as the best ways to prevent lawsuits (Vaughn 
et al., 2001). This is uniquely an administrative point of view. Some recent studies have 
revealed that police officers suggest that gaining support from police officers will help 
reduce misconduct (Hunter, 1999).  
It is very clear that there is no single remedy to curb police misconduct.  This 
research has attempted to discover effective ways to fight police misconduct. Police 
departments and police officials that allegedly violate the constitutional rights and 
liberties of citizens need to be investigated to find out the specific causes of the problem. 
There is no magic remedy to reform police agencies without gaining support from police 
administrators. In some agencies, there is no doubt that the only thing that prevents police 
misconduct is consent decrees. From this standpoint, consent decrees, in accordance with 
the Section 14141, show that the federal authorities are also trying to gain the support of 
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the administrators of police departments and municipalities. It is prudent to solve this 
problem in a way that does not ruin the police departments. They must protect and serve 
the community. As Goldstein states, democratic free society needs to see that rules 
regulations are enforced and order is maintained. There are many scholars who suggest 
tying the hands of police in every aspect. They think that every police department that 
receives a complaint of misconduct is at fault. Common sense, however, suggests just the 
opposite. There is an expression in the Balkan’s that the worst state is better than being 
without a state. There are a lot of legal procedures that are established after long debates 
and experiments trying to find a good way to solve problems. This is the essence of “the 
law.” 
 The law is the only remedy for the most serious problems of society. The 
knowledge of the law makes people more concerned about the rights they have and the 
duties they pay. Teaching the legal aspects of every profession to every professional is 
the only way to keep a well-balanced society, one that needs to be served and protected. 
Police departments are established for the good of the community. Consequently, there is 
a need to respect the community. On the other hand, the protectors and servants of the 
community have a right to seek respect from the community that they dedicate their lives 
to in the line of duty. At the very least, they ought to be respected for their time that is 
taken from their families and given to the community. Hence, there is only one-way to 
make a healthy society: positive criticism. 
The remedies discussed in this research other than the consent decree, are 
remedies that satisfy the victims by punishing the perpetrators. The uniqueness of the 
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consent decree is its ability to reach the root cause of the problem and make the faulty 
departments themselves restores it. Consent, either willingly or not, is the correct place to 
begin. The only thing that remains is to address the problem honestly. It is certain that all 
the administrators know what problems exist and how to solve them. The only way to 
break the code of silence is to gain the consent of the administrators, who are a member 
of the organization. 
Disciplinary action will and should be at the core of police organizations due to 
their paramilitary structure. However, the debate is over the structure of disciplinary 
boards. The trend favors the civilian review boards, despite the fact that they are found 
ineffective and weak at controlling police misconduct. 
Standards and training are required for every profession without a doubt. 
However, policing requires these factors to be more clear and effective, because as an 
enforcing agency, the police have power to abuse. Clear and understandable standards 
should supplement training. There is no question whether a police agency needs them or 
not. They are essential in a democratic society. 
Section 1983 is a very effective tool, since it aims to reach the deep pocket of 
municipalities and administrators. City managers and police chiefs are very careful about 
the burdens of civil litigation as a result of unclear policies, untrained employees, and the 
policies that may result in unconstitutional patterns or practices. However, its application 
and interpretation are vague like the exclusionary rule. 
Criminal prosecution is the weakest remedy from a general deterrence standpoint. 
Since it is used neither at the state, nor federal level very effectively, other remedies to 
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deter police misconduct have replaced it. Actually it is not abolished completely, but its 
usage is very rare, so its deterrent effect is very marginal. 
The exclusionary rule is a control placed upon police that is designed to deter 
police from unconstitutional practices. The debate over the exclusionary rule is still 
ongoing, and it may never end. Despite the fact that the exclusionary rule made a big 
impact on criminal justice practitioners and served its purpose in advance, currently it 
does not promise to fulfill the tasks established for it. 
As a conclusion, if it is properly used, Section 14141 promises success for the 
future. Its best feature is that it gives city and police managers a chance to reform their 
agencies without facing the burden of a lawsuit. This is important for one reason; it 
makes the police reform themselves. They know what the problems are and they may 
reform them better if they are given the chance. As it was in the Rizzo case, sometimes 
court rulings are not enough to force managers. However, a jointly entered consent 
decree is a positive step towards reform in a police department. However, it is not a good 
thing to support an idea one hundred percent. All remedies serve their purposes to some 
extent. This paper simply states that Section 14141 ought to be added to other remedies to 
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